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International Investment Agreements and FDI Heterogeneity: Industry 
Evidence from Japanese Multinational Companies 
 
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the impact of international trade and investment agreements on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) activities of Japanese multinationals in developing 
and  emerging  economies.  Based  on  transaction  cost  economics  and  institutional 
theory  it  contributes  to  the  existing  empirical  literature  by  distinguishing  treaty 
impact by the size and the asset specificity of the FDI activities. FDI activities are 
measured as the foreign affiliate employment of Japanese multinational companies 
aggregated on the industry and host country level. The importance of sunk costs, 
captured  through  the  size  of  the  affiliates  included  in  the  FDI  aggregation,  for 
explaining bilateral investment treaty (BIT) effectiveness is shown, but a significant 
role of the industry averaged R&D intensity of the parent firms, as the measure for 
asset  specificity, for BIT effectiveness is not identified. In the case of preferential 
trade  and  investment  agreements  (PTIAs)  concluded  by  other  countries,  not 
involving Japan, a different set of mechanisms is uncovered: smaller sized Japanese 
affiliates seem to be the ones that gain substantially more from the agreements than 








1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  importance  of  developing  economies  as  a  destination  for  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI) has strongly increased during the last couple of years. The share of 
developing host countries increased from an average of about 20% of worldwide FDI 
during  1999-2001  to  an  average  of  35%  between  2002-2005  (UNCTAD  2006c). 
Nevertheless, investment into these countries still often faces not only regulatory and 
legal investment barriers, but also an insecure business environment due to a high 
level  of  political  instability  deterring  long-term  and  high  profile  corporate 
involvement. Even though investor home and investment host governments design 
policies with the purpose of investment barrier and risk reduction, empirical evidence 
on  the  fact  if  these  supportive  policies  eventually  exert  impact  on  overseas 
investment activities is mixed.  
One  area  of  such  policies  is  the  conclusion  of  bilateral  or  plurilateral  investment 
agreements. Their number has been steadily increasing over the past two decades 
(UNCTAD 2006a). Two types of agreements can be distinguished in this context: 
bilateral  investment  treaties  (BITs)  and  preferential  trade  and  investment 
agreements (PTIAs). BITs mainly deal with investment treatment, its protection, the 
compensation in the case of expropriation, arbitration in the case of investor-state 
disputes,  but  increasingly  also  with  the  liberalization  of  investment  entry.  FDI 
relevant provisions within PTIAs provide for increased market access and encompass 
broader  issues  influencing  the  investment  entry,  treatment  and  protection.  These 
PTIAs  are  most  often  designed  as  trade  agreements  which  additionally  include 
provisions on investment. Well known examples of  regional PTIAs in the case of 
developing and emerging economies are for instance the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR)  or  the  Associaton  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations  Free  Trade  Area 4 
 
(AFTA).  
Although the agreements, in particular the BITs, are explicitly concluded to raise 
FDI,  it  has  not  been  confirmed  that  these  treaties  actually  attain  this  objective. 
Theoretically, international investment treaties are expected to positively influence 
FDI activities as they help governments to commit themselves credibly to protect 
and fairly treat existing investment. They also help to liberalize investment related 
laws and regulation when governments are unable to do this on a domestic scale. 
Empirically,  however,  the  eventual  role  of  the  agreements  for  investment,  in 
particular with regard to the conditions required for investment attraction, has not 
been clearly identified.  
With respect to the relevance of BITs for FDI, studies have multiplied during the 
past years leading to diverging results – differences in the outcome stem from varying 
samples, variable specifications, and estimation methodologies. In particular the more 
recent  studies  have  enlarged  the  samples  analyzed  in  terms  of  years  and  country 
coverage (e.g., Busse et al. 2008), have developed more detailed measures for the BIT 
measure  (Yackee  2006),  and  have  focused  on  the  role  of  the  domestic  and 
international  embeddedness  for  treaty  effectiveness  (Neumayer  and  Spess  2005; 
Yackee 2006; Desbordes and Vicard 2007; Tobin and Busch 2007; Busse et al. 2008). 
Also,  attempts  were  undertaken  to  overcome  the  problem  of  reverse  causality 
(Aisbett 2007; Egger and Merlo 2007; Busse et al. 2008). On the individual country 
level  only  US  BITs  and  US  FDI  have  been  analyzed  in  more  detail  though  FDI 
activities were not disaggregated to the industry or firm level (Salacuse and Sullivan 
2005; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Haftel 2007). In the case of PTIAs, existing 
studies  can  be  divided  into  three  kinds:  those  that  focus  on  selected  regional 5 
 
agreements in detail and analyze their impact on FDI
1; those that use a dummy 
variable as the explanatory variable for agreement conclusion, and those that try to 
fill  the  black  box  of  agreement  conclusion  with  regard  to  treaty  contents  or 
characteristics  of  the  member  nations.  The  outcome  on  the  relevance  of  PTIA 
membership is mixed ranging from insignificant to positive (e.g., Levy et al. 2003; 
Medvedev 2006; Buethe and Milner 2008). Non-trade provisions of PTIAs, including 
those related to investment, seem to attract FDI from treaty-outsider countries (Dee 
and Gali 2003; Te Velde and Bezemer 2006). Moreover, the relevance of market size 
of the treaty partners has been established (Jaumotte 2004; Medvedev 2006) and the 
importance of the country positioning within a treaty area highlighted (Levy et al. 
2003; Jaumotte 2004; Te Velde and Bezemer 2006). 
One major shortcoming of these studies has been that they have only used pooled 
country-level  FDI  data.  However,  based  on  transaction  cost  economics  and 
institutional  theory,  agreement  effects  are  expected  to  differ  according  to  FDI 
characteristics. Hence, this paper contributes by distinguishing agreement effects by 
the size as well as the specificity of the involved assets.   
Since reliable disaggregated FDI data on a cross-country basis is not available, one 
investor nation is focused on – Japan. Japan is one of the top-five investor nations 
worldwide  and  has  an  unusually  high  share  of  investment  within  developing  and 
emerging  economies  (UNCTAD  2006c).  The  Japanese  government  is  known  to 
strongly support its companies abroad through targeted foreign aid, strong export 
financing activities, the provision of information on foreign markets, and its close 
                                       
1 Studies emerged with respect to NAFTA (Blomstrom and Kokko 1997; Waldkirch 2003; Buckley et al. 2007), the 
EU (e.g., Dunning 1997b; 1997a; Brenton et al. 1999; Clegg and Scott-Green 1999; Altomonte 2007; Iwasaki and 
Suganuma 2007), for MERCOSUR (e.g., Blomstrom and Kokko 1997; Page 2001), and ASEAN (e.g., Haftel 2006). 6 
 
cooperation  with  Japanese  trading  companies  (Hatch  and  Yamamura  1996; 
Katzenstein 2005). The role of investment agreements for Japanese business activities 
has  only  lately  received  attention  as  a  result  of  the  high  activism  the  Japanese 
government has shown in concluding bilateral trade and investment agreements. 
Overall, FDI activities are measured by aggregating the foreign affiliate employment 
of Japanese multinational companies by the sector of the Japanese parent firm and 
by the host country. Two FDI measures, general and large FDI, are used according 
to the size of the affiliates included in the aggregation. For the period 1990-2004 
different specifications controlling for unobserved effects on the industry-host country 
level are estimated. The importance of sunk costs captured through the size of the 
affiliates included in the FDI aggregation for BIT effectiveness is supported, but a 
significant role of the industry averaged R&D intensity of the parent firms – as the 
measure for asset specificity – for BIT effectiveness is not confirmed. In the case of 
PTIAs  concluded  by  other  countries,  not  involving  Japan,  a  different  set  of 
mechanisms  is  uncovered:  smaller-sized  affiliates  seem  to  be  the  ones  that  gain 
substantially more from the agreements than the large ones. A link between asset 
specificity and PTIA effectiveness is established.  
The paper is structured as follows: First, the institutional background is provided and 
hypotheses  are  derived.  After  presenting  the  FDI  data,  methodology  and  an 
econometric  model,  findings  are  discussed.  In  the  conclusion  major  outcomes  are 
summarized and future research steps are indicated.  7 
 
 
2.  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND  
Multilateral approaches to regulate and protect FDI have not succeeded over the last 
decades  (Sornarajah  2004;  Gugler  and  Tomsik  2007).  Instead,  a  complex  web  of 
PTIAs and BITs has emerged governing FDI sometimes even leading to overlapping 
investment regimes. 
PTIA conclusion has rapidly grown since the 1990s. The WTO cites as many as 205 
agreements (including enlargements of existing treaties) that were notified to it by 
May  2008  (WTO  2008).  These  PTIAs  can  include  both  bilateral  and  plurilateral 
agreements as well as those confined to regional agglomerations of countries or inter-
regional  ones.  Overall,  coverage  of  PTIAs  has  increased  in  scope  over  the  years. 
Formerly,  tariff  liberalization  and  other  measures  governing  trade  played  an 
important  role  in  the  design.  However,  as  tariff  lines  have  already  been  highly 
liberalized, new issues, foremost investment, but also intellectual property rights or 
government procurement, are increasingly covered (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005). 
When taking a closer look at seven regional trade and investment agreements (RTIA) 
covering developing and emerging economies – based on a selection by Te Velde and 
Bezemer (2006) with a similar research background – differences in treaty design and 
membership  become  evident  (Table  8  and Table  9  in  the  appendix).  In  terms  of 
market size the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tops the list while 
the  African  agreements  -  the  Common  Market  for  Eastern  and  Southern  Africa 
(COMESA) as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) - and 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are at the end of the spectrum. With regard 
to  trade  liberalization  measures  NAFTA,  the  Southern  Common  Market 
(MERCOSUR),  the  Andean  Community  (ANDEAN),  CARICOM  and  the 
Association of South East Asian Nations FTA (AFTA) claim to have intra-regional 8 
 
trade which is almost duty-free though they all exclude sensitive industries from the 
low-tariff  regime.  All  agreements  have  incorporated  some  degree  of  investment 
clauses. Again, NAFTA has gone furthest. Besides ANDEAN, investment rules of 
none of the selected treaties can be fully applied by investors from countries outside 
the  relevant  region.  However,  in  ANDEAN  national  exemptions  to  the  regional 
provisions are permitted rendering a regional approach ineffective.   
Also, BITs have rapidly proliferated since the first BIT was signed between Germany 
and Pakistan in 1959 (UNCTAD 2007). In particular during the 1990s BITs were 
rapidly  diffusing  though  growth  has  again  decreased  since  2002.  By  2006  they 
amounted to 2,573 (UNCTAD 2007). Although BITs are negotiated on a bilateral 
basis  leading  to  a  variety  of  outcomes,  they  are  increasingly  converging  as  FDI 
exporting  nations  possess  model  treaties  along  which  they  negotiate,  which,  over 
time,  have  also  started  to  become  more  similar.  Nevertheless,  differences  between 
BITs continue to persist (Elkins et al. 2006).  
Japan started to adopt a plurilateral and bilateral trade and investment policy only 
as multilateral trade negotiations within the WTO came to a standstill at the end of 
the 1990s (Cho 2007), and all other major industrial nations were strongly promoting 
a  large  network  of  bilateral  and  plurilateral  trade  and  investment  agreements 
(Pempel  and  Urata  2006).  Hence,  PTIAs,  in  Japan  referred  to  as  Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) – which include both trade and investment issues – 
have  only  been  concluded  since  2002  –  of  which  most  of  the  seven  finalized 
agreements  (Singapore,  Mexico,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  Brunei,  Indonesia  and  Chile) 
after 2004. One more has been signed (Philippines) and seven are under negotiation. 
Due to their recent nature and data availability, it was not possible to include the 9 
 
agreements in the analysis.
 2  
Japan  is  the  industrialized  country  that  has  signed  the  lowest  number  of  BITs 
(UNCTAD 2007) having ratified 13 BITs (Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Hong Kong, 
Korea,  Mongolia,  Pakistan,  Russia,  Sri  Lanka,  Turkey,  Vietnam,  Laos  and 
Cambodia)  while  one  more  was  signed  in  this  August  (Uzbekistan).  Also,  it  is 
currently in negotiations with Saudi-Arabia and Peru as well as on a trilateral basis 
with  China  and  Korea.
.Furthermore,  talks  with  Qatar  are  carried  out  (MOFA 
2008b).
 Also BIT negotiations have risen strongly with the implementation of the new 
investment  and  trade  agreement  strategy  of  the  Japanese  government  at  the 
beginning of this millenium. Motivations for treaty conclusion follow the ones found 
on  the  global  level  (Elkins  et  al.  2006;  Neumayer  2006)–  besides  altruistic  and 
strategic political motives, economic reasons seem to have dominated in particular 
with the implementation of this new strategy. Lately, energy security has become a 
major rationale for agreement negotiation (MOFA 2008b). Despite the small number 
of BITs in which Japan is directly involved, those that have been concluded are of 
relatively strong nature with respect to treaty contents. All BITs include provisions 
on  investment  protection,  transparency  enhancement  and  dispute  settlement 
procedures,  and  the  agreements  concluded  after  2002  also  include  FDI  entry 
liberalization clauses.
3 Table 10 in the appendix provides an overview of the Japanese 
                                       
2 Though the Singapore agreement is concluded within the period of investigation, including only one treaty as 
representative for a whole set of agreements was not considered appropriate. 
3 Although  the  conclusion  of  BITs  started  rather  late  (1978),  Commercial  Conventions  or  “Japan  Friendship 
Commerce And Navigation Treaties” served as their antecedents in the period between 1958-1980 (Matsui 1989; 
Yanase 2003). Of the total of 27 agreements, nine were concluded with developing economies (India, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Cuba, Pakistan, Peru, Indonesia, El Salvador, Argentina, Mexico). Being relatively broad agreements 
covering trade and investment issues, the rules on investment were rather weak and due to a lack of procedural 
provisions only had limited effect (Matsui 1989; Sakurai 1996). When it became more difficult for the Japanese 




3.  HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Literature on FDI determinants in the international business and trade fields is vast 
and rather inconclusive to such a degree that empirical research on FDI often relies 
on an ad-hoc specification of FDI determinants that results in diverging outcomes 
(Chakrabati  2001;  Blonigen  2005).  One  theoretic  approach  that  takes  a  macro 
perspective and is widely applied in literature is grounded in the international new 
trade  literature  and  uses  gravity  theory  arguments  to  FDI  (Carr  et  al.  2001; 
Markusen and Maskus 2002; Helpman et al. 2004; Braconier et al. 2005).
4  
A different line of reasoning focuses on the multinational firm and the micro-level of 
international business activities in explaining FDI. Here, transaction costs, market 
imperfections and institutional uncertainties have been highlighted as major reasons 
for  the  internalization  of  activities  across  borders  within  one  firm  through  FDI 
instead  of  carrying  out  exporting,  licensing  or  other  non-equity  regimes  to  serve 
foreign markets (Buckley and Casson 1976; Rugman 1981; Hennart 1982; Teece 1986; 
Henisz and Williamson 1999; Henisz 2003). Reasoning is rooted in the works of Coase 
(1937) and Williamson (1975). Characteristics along which the transactions and the 
costs incurred in the different governance regimes vary are the frequency with which 
the transaction occurs, the uncertainty surrounding the transaction, and the degree 
to which asset specific investments have to be carried out (Teece 1986; Williamson 
                                                                                                                     
BITs (Matsui 1989). 
4 In its origins the gravity model related bilateral trade flows positively to the size of markets, and inversely to 
factors  enhancing  or  restricting  trade  flows  among  two  countries  (as  tariffs  or  distance)  (Andersen  and  Van 
Wincoop 2003). When applying it to FDI, the standard gravity explanatory variables have been extended to 
include relative factor endowment differences between the home and host country besides absolute and relative 
country size (e.g., Carr et al. 2001; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004). 11 
 
1991). The more frequent a transaction, the cheaper it becomes to internalize the 
cross-border activity within one firm. Furthermore, the higher the asset specificity 
the more risky inter-firm co-operations become encouraging FDI or simple trading: 
The  asset  specificity  is  high  when  one  or  both  parties  to  a  transaction  invest  in 
equipment which is especially designed to carry out the transaction. It has a much 
lower  second  best  use  value  (Williamson  1979)  increasing  the  risk  of  quasi-rent 
appropriation. In the case of a highly uncertain environment, firms are expected to 
avoid  ownership.  Ownership  commits  them  to  one  operation  that  may  not  be 
appropriate when a shift in the environment occurs (Williamson 1979). As companies 
have a higher risk premium when property rights and contracts are poorly enforced, 
when the risk of civil wars, coups, or involvement in international conflicts is high, 
and when the investment environment is unpredictable, firms might be inclined to 
not carry out any investment in such environments, or, if they do, only in small size 
(Teece 1986; Williamson 1991; Henisz and Williamson 1999; Williamson 2000).  
Hence, the reliability of the political environment plays a role in investment decision 
making.  The  theory  of  credible  commitment  emphasizes  reputation-building  and 
institutional design as two channels through which governments can credibly commit 
themselves and can guarantee a fair definition and eventual enforcement of property 
rights. In this context delegation of authority from the government to independent 
agents, such as international agreements, forms an important element (Kydland and 
Prescott  1977;  North  and  Weingast  1989;  Drazen  2000).  International  agreements 
help to overcome the problem of time-inconsistent behaviour of governments as they 
are more credible than purely domestic commitments due to higher costs involved 
when  reneging  on  them  (Teece  1986;  Martin  and  Simmons  1998).  However, 
expropriation also provides rents to a government and one can expect a leveling out 
of expected gains and losses associated with attracting FDI and the incentive for 
treaty compliance (Teece 1986; Henisz and Williamson 1999; Ginsburg 2004, 2006; 
Aisbett 2007).   12 
 
Hence, investment protection agreements can work as safeguards and raise the level 
of  ownership  and  the  size  of  FDI  involvement:  The  larger  the  sunk  costs  of  the 
investment  and  the  importance  of  a  subsidiary  for  a  company,  the  higher  the 
relevance of the reliability of the political environment. As BITs have been designed 
with  the  purpose  of  guaranteeing  a  fair  treatment  and  protection  of  the  foreign 
investments of Japanese companies in the partner countries, a positive influence is 
expected for such kind of FDI. 
Hypothesis 1: BITs increase large-scale FDI activities.  
With regard to the PTIAs entering the sample during the empirical analysis Japan is 
only an outsider nation. Hence, while BITs exert a commitment effect, PTIAs only 
signal  a  more  reliable  business  environment  for  the  investors  from  the  “treaty-
outsider” Japan.
5 Although the strength of such signaling effects is disputed (e.g., 
Waldkirch  2006),  empirical  research  has  found  investment  provisions  to  play  a 
significant role for agreement outsiders to RTIAs (Dee and Gali 2003; Te Velde and 
Bezemer 2006). Hence, a signaling impact should exist, but is expected to be weaker 
than in the case of a credibility effect. 
Moreover,  the  trade  clauses  included  in  PTIAs  can  have  various  effects  on  FDI 
activities also for investors from non-PTIA member countries making it difficult to 
capture the signaling effect favouring larger-sized affiliates. For Japanese companies 
that have already established (an) affiliate(s) within the treaty area market-seeking 
(non-asset-specific)  FDI,  if  it  occurs  at  all,  will  rather  be  of  smaller  size  as  the 
                                       
5 The agreements would have only direct applicability to Japanese investors with respect to investment protection 
if  they  included  clauses  on  investment  protection  for  investments  from  firms  from  non-member  countries. 
Concerning  the  seven  RTIAs  which  are  looked  at  in  more  detail,  none  has  such  clauses  currently  fully 
implemented (Table 8). 13 
 
Japanese firms can serve the market from the already existing investment via trade. 
If multiple affiliates have been existing within a treaty area, Japanese parent firms 
may also choose to streamline their activities encouraging large affiliates in a certain 
location.  When  investment  had  not  entered  the  treaty  area  before,  the  trade-off 
between gains through lower tariff costs due to the PTIA and the additional up-front 
costs necessary to establish an investment, is expected to encourage the establishment 
of rather small affiliates (Te Velde and Fahnbulleh 2003). Due to the multitude of 
effects occurring, the impact of the PTIAs on the size of the affiliates is not clear cut. 
Therefore, PTIAs should not increase large FDI to a higher degree than general FDI. 
Hypothesis 2: PTIAs will increase large FDI activities to a smaller extent than 
BITs,  and  will  have  equal  impact  on  general,  including  both  small  and  large, 
investments. 
FDI as opposed to the foreign market entry mode “trade” is more likely to occur 
when the specificity of the assets transferred to the foreign affiliate rises. The more 
uncertain and volatile the external environment of a firm, the less likely a firm is to 
transfer these assets to the country due to the increased appropriability risks (e.g., 
Anderson  and  Gatignon  1986).  BITs  are  designed  to  protect  and  fairly  treat 
investments  and  increase  the  credibility  of  domestic  institutions  and  policies. 
Therefore,  they  should  again  work  as  safeguards  in  this  context  and  raise  the 
investment level. 
Hypothesis 3: BITs will lead to a rise in FDI activities in the presence of high asset 
specificity. 
The reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers in the case of the PTIAs also render 
intra-corporate  transactions  cheaper.  Hence,  whenever  there  is  the  necessity  for 
internalizing the transactions, thus when trade is no alternative, and firms also wish 
to  benefit  from  new  market  opportunities  created  through  the  PTIAs,  FDI  is 14 
 
expected to increase. As finding market partners is difficult in the case of high asset 
specificity, forming such a necessity, FDI is expected to increase (Blomstrom and 
Kokko 1997; Medvedev 2006).  
Hypothesis 4: PTIAs will promote highly asset specific FDI. 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL SET UP  
4.1.  The Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment 
The size of FDI activities is captured in terms of subsidiary employment of Japanese 
firms  in  the  host  countries.  As  the  interpretation  of  financial  flow  or  stock  FDI 
measures is difficult due to round-tripping as well as trans-shipment of investment 
(UNCTAD 2006c), it has become common to use the number of affiliates and data on 
sales and employment for the measurement of the productive activities of affiliates of 
multinational companies – constituting FDI – abroad (e.g., Lipsey 2007). Following a 
recent stream of literature and due to data availability employment has been selected 
(Zhou et al. 2002; Asiedu 2004; Belderbos and Zou 2006, 2007). Employment is well 
apt  for  the  analysis  of  FDI  activities  in  developing  countries  as  investment  is 
expected  to  be  primarily  labor-seeking  due  to  the  existence  of  factor  price 
differentials.  It  should  thus  provide  a  good  measure  for  capturing  the  production 
occurring in these countries. Furthermore, in terms of policy analysis, the impact of 
the agreements on multinational enterprise (MNE) employment should be of interest 
as employment has been highlighted as one means through which FDI spillover takes 
place.  Multinational  employment  has  been  found  to  increase  wages,  domestic 
employment figures, lead to transfer of technology and the productivity improvement 
of the labor force (e.g., Asiedu 2004).  
Data  stems  from  the  Toyo  Keizai’s  annual  compendia  on  Japanese  overseas 15 
 
investment (ToyoKeizai Annual volumes 1990-2005) which provide microdata of the 
subsidiaries of Japanese firms abroad. The dataset is compiled annually from surveys 
and  is  supplemented  with  information  from  annual  reports  and  media 
announcements. The survey is sent out to both listed and non-listed firms and thus 
covers  investments  by  small,  medium-sized  and  large  businesses.  It  reputedly 
represents  the  total  of  Japanese  foreign  investment  activity  and enjoys  increasing 
acceptance among academic researchers (e.g., Delios and Henisz 2003; Makino et al. 
2004).  
The affiliate level employment information is aggregated to two FDI variables  ijt Y – 
one  which  only  includes  the  employees  of  large-sized  investments 
ls
ijt Y ,  and  one 
which, on top of these, counts also the ones of the smaller-sized subsidiaries termed 
general  FDI 
ge
ijt Y .  Both  measure  the  employment  in  the  affiliates  which  can  be 
attributed to the investment of Japanese parent firms p in industry j in country i in 
year t and will be termed “Japanese employment” in the following. 





The employment of each subsidiary is multiplied with the share of overall Japanese 
ownership in the subsidiary. If several Japanese firms invested in the affiliate, the 
sum of their ownership stakes was used. Only employment in those subsidiaries is 
considered for the two measures in which Japanese firms own at least 10%.
6 The 
resulting employment figures are then aggregated over industry j in country i in year 
                                       
6 An interest of 10 percent or more of the stock or voting power of the foreign enterprise has been defined as the 
threshold level for a long-term interest – as opposed to a short term interest as in the case of portfolio investment 
– by the OECD FDI benchmark definition (OECD 1996) and in the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual IMF 
(IMF 1993). 16 
 
t. General FDI 
ge
ijt Y  includes all affiliates – small and large ones – with complete 
employment and ownership information in the database in the aggregation and with 
a minimum level of Japanese employment of two. The second variable, large scale 
FDI 
ls
ijt Y ,  includes  only  those  affiliates  which  have  at  least  100  Japanese  FDI 
employees.  Twenty-three  industry  categories  j  were  formed  based  on  parent  firm 
affiliation. They encompass non-manufacturing, manufacturing, and service sectors as 
well as the construction, utilities, wholesale and retail industries.  
In order to reduce the skewness in the data, the FDI measures are transformed with a 
natural logarithm. Table 11 and Table 12 in the appendix show descriptive statistics. 
4.2.  Methodology   
The dependent variable ijt Y , employment, is a partly continuous non-negative variable 
which has a positive probability mass at one point – at zero. Least squares estimation 
is inconsistent on such corner solution data as it assumes constant partial effects and 
predicts  negative  values  (Wooldridge  2002).  A  tobit  model  can  be  used  in  this 
context incorporating information on the decision whether to go international and on 
the decision on how much to invest, thus, how many employees to employ (e.g., Carr 
et al. 2001; Zhou et al. 2002; Verbeek 2004; Buch and Lipponer 2007).  
The standard tobit model for a country-industry panel ij with random effects is  
(2)  ijt ij ijt ijt u X y + + ¢ = l b
*  
(3)  ) , 0 max(
*
ijt ijt y y = .     
for   T t M j N i ,..., 1 ; ,..., 1 ; ,..., 1 = = = .     
) , 0 ( ~
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The sub-index i refers to the country,  j  to the industry, and t to year.     ijt X refers 
to the vector of explanatory variables    x
k (for k=1,….,K),      b to the vector of their 
coefficients.  Subsequently,  the  vector      b also  entails  K-elements.
7  The  country-
industry  specific  effects  ij l  and  the  error  ijt u  are  both  normally  distributed  and 
independent  from  each  other  and  the  explanatory  variables  with  the  respective 
standard errors  l s  and  u s . 
*
ijt y  is  the  latent  dependent  variable  for  the  industry-country  panel  ij  in  period  t 
which can be interpreted as the propensity that Japanese companies have positive 
employment in a country in a certain year due to the explanatory variables. The 
dependent variable  ijt y  has a minimum value of zero. An indicator function selects 
the appropriate density for each of the two possible cases – if employment is 0 or if 
employment takes on a positive value. A normal cumulative distribution function is 
assumed  (Wooldridge  2002).  See  the  appendix  for  the  Log-likelihood  function 
(Appendix 1).  
As the regression coefficients only measure the impact of the explanatory variables on 
the latent dependent variable 
* y , marginal effects are used to interpret the impact of 
the explanatory variables on the expected value of the dependent variable  y . These 
partial derivatives can be decomposed into two parts: The impact of an explanatory 
variable 
k x  on the change in the dependent variable  y  given that positive values are 
observed and the change on the probability that the observation is positive weighted 
by the expected value of y if above zero (McDonald and Moffit 1980). 
8  
                                       
7 If a constant is included into the equation specification, then 
1 x  = 1 for all countries, industries and years, and 
    
1 b is thus this constant term. 
8 For binary variables (e.g., entry into force of an agreement), the difference between the value when the variable 
takes on the value1 and when it is 0 is taken. 18 
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If not otherwise noted, these effects are measured at the means of the explanatory 
variables following conventional literature. In order to get inference on the marginal 
effects, the delta method, implemented in Stata, is used. 
In  the  case  of  interaction  effects  the  marginal  effects  of  each  of  the  interacted 
variables have to be correctly adjusted. Not accounting for the interaction in the 
marginal effect calculation of the interacted variables, the first derivative, and in the 
calculation  of  the  interaction  itself,  the  second  derivative,  will  bias  coefficients 
upwards  or  downwards  and  change  standard  errors  and  significance  levels 
(Braumöller 2004; Brambor et al. 2006; Norton et al. 2004).  19 
 
The first derivative for the interaction between R&D intensity (R&D) and BIT for e 
is 
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. 
The  interaction  term  between  the  two  variables  is  abbreviated  with  INT.  For 
presentation purposes zpos and zzer is defined as  
(10)  & & 1 1 & INT BIT R D
pos
X R D R D
z
b b b b
s
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zer
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The  second  derivative  is  approximated  through  the  normed  change  in  treaty 
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Appendix 2 provides details on the derivations. 
4.3.  Empirical Model  
The empirical model is as follows:  
(13)  ( 1) 0 , 1 ( 1) log max(0, )
E P
ij t F it X it X it I jt t t ij t Y F C C I T a b b b b b e + + + ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ = + + + + + +  
An  country  i -  industry  j -year  t  panel  is  constructed.  The  sample  includes  135 
developing and emerging countries i over 23 (20) manufacturing, primary sector and 
service (non-service) industries for the years 1990-2004 leading to a total number of 







) 853 , 33 ( 42,067  based  on  3,105  (2,700)  unique  country-20 
 
industry pairs  t N .
9 
The relevant aggregated Japanese affiliate employment  ijt Y  or the value 0, when no 
investment has occurred, is assigned to a country i- industry  j -year t pair. Though 
ijt Y are  not  stationary,  the  Johansen  Cointegration  test  shows  that  at  least  one 
cointegration  relationship  exists.  The  explanatory  variables  are  all  lagged  by  one 
period to mitigate the reverse causality problem. Fit refers to the vector of the focus 
variables  –  the  international  investment  and  trade  agreements.  The  choice  of 
economic control variables included in the vector 
E
it C  has been motivated by gravity 
reasoning while variables capturing the “new institutional economics” arguments are 
the political environment 
P
it C  and the transaction cost measuring variables on the 
industry  level  jt I .  The  vector  of  the  time  dummies  t T  contains  14  elements 
corresponding to dummies for all years t but the first year. They are included to 
control for global shocks. Interaction terms between the industry measure for asset 
specificity and the treaties to test hypotheses 3 and 4 are added. Table 14 in the 
appendix provides information on variable constructions and the datasouces.  
The ratification of a BIT with Japan is accounted for with a dummy variable which 
is 1 if the destination country i has ratified a BIT with Japan in or prior to year t 
(Jap. BITs). Otherwise it is 0.
10 Five measures for the PTIAs are separately included 
                                       
9 All those countries were included in the set-up that were classified by the World Bank as low and middle income 
countries in 2005 according to their gross national income (GNI) per capita (World Bank 2007) as well as a 
selected number of high income emerging economies (Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and 
Taiwan). Table 13 in the appendix enumerates the sample. 
10 Although  it  would  have  been  of  interest  to  distinguish  the  agreements  according  to  content  and  capture 
differential treaty impact on FDI in this regard, differentiation was not possible due to the limited number of 
agreements realized during the investigation period. Also, the commercial treaties concluded prior to the 1980s are 
not included due to the fact that they were all concluded prior to the investigation period and because contents 
with respect to investment protection are very limited (Matsui 1989; Sakurai 1996). The only Japanese PTIAs - 
the EPAs – that has been concluded within the time frame of interest is the one with Singapore. When treating it 
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in the regressions: A dummy variable which captures membership for country i in 
year  t  in  at  least  one  PTIA  as  notified  to  the  WTO  (WTO-PTIAs)  allows  for 
estimating the impact of the multitude of PTIAs that have developed over the years. 
The regional PTIAs selected by Te Velde and Bezemer (2006) are inserted in a next 
step via a membership dummy (Member RTIA), the additional market size generated 
through the agreements by taking the natural logarithm of the sum of the total GDP 
of the partner countries (Log Reg.GDP), and the indices of trade (Trade Index) and 
investment liberalization (Inv. Index) which have been developed by Te Velde and 
Bezemer (2006) for these agreements. The values 1 to 3 are assigned to the respective 
agreement according to the levels of trade or investment liberalization attained (3 
being the highest), and 0 relating to no liberalization at all (Table 8).  
Economic control variables are modeled after a specification which has been used by 
Buch et al (2005) omitting interaction effects included by, for instance, Carr et al. 
(2001):  Since  the  testing  of  the  hypotheses  already  relies  on  interactions,  the 
interpretation of the model would have been rendered very complicated. The size of 
the host economy is proxied by the natural logarithm of the gross domestic product 
(Log GDP). It is proposed that the larger the market, the more market-seeking FDI 
will be attracted. The natural logarithm of distance is used as a measure for distance 
related  transaction  costs  such  as  transportation  costs  (Log  Distance)  predicting  a 
negative relationship.
11 One further measure for the economic similarity of the host 
                                                                                                                     
as a Japanese BIT, thus as if no preferential trade clauses were included in the treaty and adding it to the BIT 
dummy variable, the outcome with respect to the impact of the BIT variable does not change. Results are not 
reported, but are available on request. 
11 In the case of horizontal FDI, FDI should increase with distance to serve a market. In the case of vertical FDI, 
FDI should decrease as distance related costs grow. Furthermore, in line with geographic distance institutional 
distance (including psychic and cultural distance) is expected to grow discouraging FDI in general (e.g., Egger and 
Pfaffermayr 2004). Due to the nature of the dependent variable which captures employment and as such vertical 
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and home countries (Similarity) is included which is measured as the host country’s 
GDP  per  capita  divided  by  Japanese  GDP  per  capita  (Buch  et  al.  2005).  Cost 
reduction motivated FDI will occur when countries are dissimilar in factor costs while 
market motivated FDI will happen in the case of similar countries. As labor-seeking 
FDI should play an important role in developing countries, a negative coefficient is 
predicted (Markusen and Maskus 2002). Thus, the similarity measure also serves as a 
proxy for wage differentials between Japan and the host economy.  
A country’s openness to trade measured as trade related to GDP (Trade openness) 
has also been highlighted as being strongly positively related to FDI in an extreme-
bound  analysis  (Chakrabati  2001)  and  is  thus  included  in  the  regression.  Further 
economic control variables – inflation, total FDI within a host country, and natural 
resources – are added during sensitivity checks.  
The domestic institutional political environment of each host country at time t is 
measured  by  the  political  constraints  index  (POLCON).  The  index  attempts  to 
objectively measure the political institutional stability of an economy through “the 
extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in 
government policy” (Henisz 2002: 363).
12 The larger the value, the more constraints 
exist  and  the  more  difficult  it  becomes  to  change  policies  making  the  business 
environment  more  predictable  for  the  firm.  As  an  alternative  measure  the 
International  Country  Risk  Guide  (ICRG)  composite  index  (ICRG)  is  applied.  It 
                                                                                                                     
labor-seeking FDI, Japanese FDI activities can be expected to decrease as distance increases. 
12 POLCON measures the number of independent branches of government representing veto players, the party 
alignment of the executive and legislative branches, and alignment within the legislative branch. An additional 
veto player decreases the likelihood of a policy change, but with diminishing returns, and the homogeneity of 
party preferences within an opposition branch of government increases constraints. Spatial modelling techniques 
are used to derive a value between 0 and 1 (Henisz 2002). 23 
 
ranges from 0-100 while 0 refers to high risk and 100 to low risk (PRS 1996). The 
ICRG  Index  addresses  political  risk  in  general.  As  a  proxy  for  Japanese  home 
government policies, development aid is included measured as the natural logarithm 
of the amount of official development assistance which is disbursed by Japan (Log 
Jap. ODA) in the respective host countries.
13 The positive role of Japanese ODA for 
FDI  through  infrastructure  development,  information  generation,  business  system 
transplantation, and an investment securing effect has been established in empirical 
studies  (Blaise  2005;  Kimura  and  Todo  2007).  To  account  for  a  country’s  trade 
policies, its commitments to open markets and liberal economic policies membership 
to  the  WTO  (WTO  member)  is  added.  As  most  countries  belong  to  the  WTO 
nowadays,  impact  of  pure  membership  on  a  country’s  FDI  attractiveness  is 
questionable per se (Rose 2003). No significant impact is expected.  
Industry specific variables  jt I are based on averages of the consolidated financial data 
from  listed  companies  which  own  foreign  affiliates  in  the  respective  countries  - 
excluding financial and insurance companies.
14 Except of the agriculture, the mining 
and the printing industry, a sufficient number of parent firm observations is given. 
Overall, the higher the average Net Sales in an industry, the more productive the 
industry is expected to be, and the larger the expected foreign investment activities 
(Helpman et al. 2004). Highly R&D intensive investments, measured as the Research 
and  Development  expenses  over  Net  Sales  (R&D  Ind.  Mean)  are  assumed  to  be 
particularly asset specific as knowledge takes a long time to build and is organization 
                                       
13 It includes both grants and loans. If in certain years no value for Japanese ODA spending was indicated for a 
country, but some other donour had provided aid, zero Japanese ODA disbursements were assumed. Negative 
flows were set to 0 after the positive values were transformed. 
14 These values stem from the industrial financial indicators collected by the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) 
for the years 1989-2003. Table 15 in the appendix shows descriptive statistics per industry.  24 
 
specific. This measure is, however, only a rough proxy as it captures a parent firm 
instead of the transaction, thus FDI characteristics, and is furthermore aggregated at 
the industry level. The R&D time series has a structural break due to a change in 
data-reporting  in  1999.  As  such,  an  interaction  term  between  the  R&D  intensity 
measure with a dummy variable for the years 1999-2004 (R&D Ind. Mean >=1999) is 
added in the relevant regressions.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
 
Dependent Variable         
Log Employment (General)  0.81  2.19  0  12.323 
Log Employment (Large Scale)  0.61  2.02  0  12.3 
 
Country Level         
Log GDP  22.88  1.95  17.452  28.074 
Similarity  0.07  0.10  0.00  0.70 
Log Distance  9.170  0.49  7.05  9.830 
Trade Openness  81.03  49.85  13.24  398.80 
POLCON  0..36  0..311  0  0.89 
ICRG Composite Index  60.48  12.14  8.50  89.13 
BIT  0.0384  0.192  0  1 
WTO-PTIAs  0.53  0.50  0  1 
Membership in Selected RTIAs  0.2  0.4  0  1 
Trade Index  0.46  0.81  0.00  3.00 
Investment Index  0.45  0.77  0.00  3.00 
Log Japanese ODA  13.57  6.32  0  21.03 
Log Japanese ODA (>0)  16.23  2.15  9.09  21.03 
Log Japanese ODA p.c. (>0)  0.36  1.87  -7.21  6.21 
Trade Restr.  0.46  0.81  0  3 
Inv. Index  0.45  0.77  0  3 
Log. Inflation  2.34  1.48  -4.6  10.19 
Log of Tot. FDI Inflows Host Country  17.28  5.29  0  24.6 
Log Natural Resources   2.05  1.91  -7.77  4.60 
WTO-Member  0.68  0.47  0  1 
 
Industry Level         
Log Net Sales  18.85  0..83  16.735  21.12 
R&D Ind. Mean   0.02  0.01  0  0.06 
R&D Ind. Mean >=1999  0.01  0.02  0  0.06 
Notes: The descriptive statistics are from the base regression (Table 2 colum 1). Descriptive statistics of all those variables not 
included in the base regressions are from the relevant regressions.  
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Overall, in order to test for the relevance of firm heterogeneity regressions are run for 
both  general  FDI  and  large-scale  FDI  and  a  measure  for  asset  specificity  (R&D 
specificity) is interacted with the agreements.  
 
5.  RESULTS  
In all specifications, the control variables have the expected signs – which provides 
evidence for the reliability of the data and the empirical set-up. Cross-correlations of 
the variables included in the base regression (Table 2 column 1 shows the output) 
provide no sign for multicollinearity (Table 16 in the appendix).  
BITs should be of relevance in particular for large-scale FDI (hypothesis 1). Using 
general  FDI  as  the  dependent  variable  (Table  2  column  1),  thus  including  all 
affiliates  also  the  smaller-sized  ones,  the  positive  impact  of  BITs  is  not  robustly 
significant. When limiting the sample to developing countries (column 2), thus to the 
low  and  middle  income  countries  according  to  the  World  Bank  classification,  the 
significance  level  drops.  Replacing  the  measure  for  the  political  environment, 
POLCON, with the ICRG index, BITs turn insignificant in the case of developing 
countries (column 3). Further sensitivity checks show that the BITs do not robustly 
influence  general  Japanese  FDI  activities:  For  instance,  when  including  the  total 
amount of FDI attracted to the host country by all investor nations and the inflation 
variable, Japanese BITs turn insignificant (column 4). However, when limiting the 
affiliates included in the dependent variable calculation to those with an affiliate size 
of at least 100 Japanese employees, the agreement is always of 1% significance (Table 
2 columns 4-8), also when changing sample sizes and the included variables. BIT 
impact is also higher for large FDI than in the case of the general FDI estimation. A 
BIT raises the Japanese employment in the countries with positive employment by 
about  14-25%  at  the  mean  values  of  the  other  explanatory  variables  (e).  The 26 
 
unconditional effect, including the zero-investment countries, lies at about 2-5% (y). 
The  probability  of  an  industry  entering  a  country  is  raised  by  1%  through  the 
conclusion of a BIT (p).  
Comparison of the magnitude of the effects with the other studies estimating BIT 
impact is difficult as these use a whole range of source countries and financial FDI 
measures. Overall, the estimates obtained in this study are at the lower bound of 
those  estimated  by  others  and  thus  seem  reasonable,  e.g.,  the  GMM  and  OLS 
estimates in the study by Busse et al. (2007) range between 20 and 40%, Egger and 
Merlo (2007) estimate an increase of about 44% due to the conclusion of a BIT. 
Haftel (2007), who studies the relevance of ratified US BITs for US FDI in a fixed 
effects panel least square set-up, finds an impact of about 18-20%.  
Hypothesis 2 relates to the impact of the PTIAs on FDI according to the size of the 
investment. In the case of general FDI, using the index which measures membership 
in at least one PTIA as notified to the WTO (WTO-PTIA), a positive and significant 
coefficient  is  revealed  for  all  sample  and  variable  specifications  (Table  2).  Being 
member to an agreement increases Japanese employment by 9-10% given the FDI 
data is positive at the means of the explanatory variables (e). The probability of an 
industry  entering  a  country  rises  by  0.9-1.1%  (p).  Overall,  Japanese  employment 
increases  by  3-4%  by  being  member  to  at  least  one  of  the  PTIAs  (y). 27 
 
Table 2: Results (1) 
  General FDI  Large FDI 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)   
 
All 
Countries  ME(e, y, p) 
Dev. 
Countries  ME(e, y, p) 
Dev. 
countries  ME (e, y,p) 
All 
Countries   ME(e, y, p) 
All 
Countries  ME(e, y,p) 
Dev. 
Countries  ME (e, y,p) 
Dev. 
Countries  ME (e, y,p) 
All 
Countries   ME(e, y, p) 
Log GDP  3.211***  0.45 ;0.17  3.513***  0.46 ;0.15  3.401***  0.524 ;0.252  3.406***  0.47 ;0.17  4.935***  0.53 ;0.08  5.471***  0.56 ;0.07  5.456***  0.634 ;0.134  4.805***  0.51 ;0.08 
  (0.124)  0.05  (0.165)  0.05  (0.152)  0.070  (0.136)  0.05  (0.224)  0.02  (0.187)  0.02  (0.305)  0.032  (0.869)  0.02 
Similarity  -6.801***  -0.96 ;-0.37  -12.87***  -1.70 ;-0.54  -13.05***  -2.01 ;-0.97  -7.922***  -1.10 ;-0.40  -14.45***  -1.55 ;-0.25  -30.15***  -3.07 ;-0.39  -29.38***  -3.42 ;-0.72  -15.04***  -1.60 ;-0.24 
  (0.936)  -0.12  (2.862)  -0.17  (2.737)  -0.27  (1.210)  -0.13  (1.467)  -0.06  (5.013)  -0.10  (6.210)  -0.17  (2.599)  -0.07 
POLCON  0.586***  0.08 ;0.03  0.843***  0.11 ;0.04      0.792***  0.11 ;0.04  1.315***  0.14 ;0.02  1.870***  0.19 ;0.02      1.612***  0.17 ;0.03 
  (0.142)  0.01  (0.175)  0.01      (0.169)  0.01  (0.256)  0.01  (0.318)  0.01      (0.316)  0.01 
ICRG          0.0115**  0.002 ;0.001              0.027***  0.003 ;0.001     
          (0.00448)  0.000              (0.00772)  0.000     
LogDistance  -3.778***  -0.53 ;-0.20  -3.519***  -0.46 ;-0.15  -3.331***  -0.51 ;-0.25  -3.353***  -0.46 ;-0.17  -5.194***  -0.56 ;-0.09  -4.773***  -0.49 ;-0.06  -4.910***  -0.57 ;-0.12  -4.602***  -0.49 ;-0.07 
  (0.302)  -0.06  (0.418)  -0.05  (0.412)  -0.07  (0.333)  -0.05  (0.505)  -0.02  (0.609)  -0.02  (0.654)  -0.03  (0.550)  -0.02 
Trade Open  0.017***  0.002 ;0.001  0.0159***  0.002 ;0.001  0.0156***  0.00 ;0.00  0.0193***  0.003 ;0.001  0.0306***  0.003 ;0.001  0.0333***  0.003 ;0.000  0.0309***  0.004 ;0.001  0.0386***  0.004;0.001 
  (0.00150)  0.000  (0.00194)  0.000  (0.00198)  0.00  (0.00179)  0.000  (0.00260)  0.000  (0.00344)  0.000  (0.00369)  0.000  (0.00343)  0.000 
Jap. BITs  0.794***  0.12 ;0.05  0.420**  0.06 ;0.02  0.276  0.04 ;0.02  0.226  0.03 ;0.01  2.179***  0.25 ;0.05  1.789***  0.19 ;0.03  1.405***  0.17 ;0.04  1.242***  0.14 ;0.02 
  (0.142)  0.01  (0.202)  0.01  (0.199)  0.01  (0.178)  0.00  (0.253)  0.01  (0.408)  0.01  (0.396)  0.01  (0.365)  0.01 
WTO-PTIA   0.608***  0.09 ;0.03  0.709***  0.09 ;0.03  0.759***  0.117 ;0.056  0.717***  0.10 ;0.04  0.507***  0.05 ;0.01  0.582***  0.06 ;0.01  0.641***  0.074 ;0.016  0.568***  0.06 ;0.01 
  (0.0781)  0.01  (0.0945)  0.009  (0.0954)  0.016  (0.0874)  0.011  (0.137)  0.002  (0.168)  0.002  (0.170)  0.004  (0.155)  0.002 
WTO-Mem.  -0.0602  -0.01 ;0.00  -0.0744  -0.01 ;0.00  -0.0954  -0.015 ;- -0.123  -0.02 ;-0.01  -0.179  -0.02 ;0.00  -0.290  -0.03 ;0.00  -0.282  -0.033 ;- -0.200  -0.02 ;0.00 
  (0.108)  0.00  (0.133)  -0.001  (0.131)  -0.002  (0.126)  -0.002  (0.183)  -0.001  (0.225)  -0.001  (0.228)  -0.002  (0.218)  -0.001 
LogJapODA  0.041***  0.01 ;0.002  0.0571***  0.01 ;0.002  0.0583***  0.009 ;0.004  0.0454***  0.01 ;0.002  0.0463***  0.01 ;0.001  0.0535***  0.005 ;0.00  0.0554***  0.006 ;0.001  0.0529***  0.006 ;0.00 
  (0.00494)  0.001  (0.00678)  0.001  (0.00669)  0.001  (0.00570)  0.001  (0.00828)  0.000  (0.0119)  0.000  (0.0119)  0.000  (0.0110)  0.000 
Total FDI              0.0227***  0.003 ;0.00              0.0330***   
              (0.00643)  0.000              (0.0105)  0.000 
Log Inflat.              -0.00540  0.00 ;0.00              -0.0540   
              (0.0264)  0.000              (0.0453)  0.000 
Constant  -50.22***    -60.28***    -59.41***    -59.41***    -86.73***    -103.6***    -102.6***    -89.78***   
  (4.205)    (5.734)    (5.541)    (4.749)    (6.893)    (7.908)    (10.42)    (20.71)   
Obs.  42067    39698    29946    36271    42067    39698    29946    36271   
Co.Ind.Pairs  3105    2944    2277    2921    3105    2944    2277    2921   
Uncensored.  6410    5040    4954    5374    3986    2999    2963    3267   28 
 
  General FDI  Large FDI 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)   
 
All 
Countries  ME(e, y, p) 
Dev. 
Countries  ME(e, y, p) 
Dev. 
countries  ME (e, y,p) 
All 
Countries   ME(e, y, p) 
All 
Countries  ME(e, y,p) 
Dev. 
Countries  ME (e, y,p) 
Dev. 
Countries  ME (e, y,p) 
All 
Countries   ME(e, y, p) 
  6.173    6.594    6.493    6.304    9.105    9.610    9.491    8.767   
  1.828    2.030    2.013    1.925    2.449    2.716    2.714    2.565   
LL  -16880    -14154    -13789    -14667    -11889    -9492    -9343    -10047   
Pseudo R2  0.35    0.33    0.33    0.33    0.33    0.31    0.30    0.31   
Results are tobit estimates. The dependent variable Yit is the natural logarithm of the share of employment attributed to the Japanese owners (total employment* investment share of 
Japanese owners within the company). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. A group is defined as an industry in a country over time. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
The marginal effects e, y and p at the means of the explanatory variables are reported next to the coefficients. The estimates for year dummies are not reported, they are, however, jointly 
significant in all of the models. Data is for 1990-2004. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. LL refers to the Log-Likelihood, Pseudo R2 is the Mc Fadden 
R2. It compares the likelihood for the intercept only model 
c M  to the likelihood for the model with the predictors 
F M : ) ( ln / ) ( ln 1
2




When  turning  to  the  selected  seven  RTIAs  (Table  3),  simple  membership  in  the 
latter leads, for instance, to about a 5% increase in employment at the means of the 
explanatory  variables  in  those  countries  where  Japanese  companies  have  invested 
(column  1)  (e).  The  additional  GDP  generated  through  the  selected  regional 
agreements  also  plays  a  significantly  positive,  but  in  economic  terms  minor  role 
(column 2). In all cases, when limiting the dependent variable to large FDI only, 
economic  magnitude  decreases.  In  the  case  of  the  PTIA  variable  measuring 
membership  to  one  of  the  agreements  notified  to  the  WTO  (WTO-PTIAs)  the 
impact on investment conditioned that it is positive ranges between 5-8% (e) while 
for all countries it falls to a 1% rise in FDI due to the conclusion of a PTIA (y) 
(Table 2). Limiting the agreements to the seven selected by Te Velde and Bezemer 
(2006) the impact is reduced to 3% for the positive employment countries and to 1% 
for all countries. Also for large  FDI, the additional GDP of the selected regional 
agreements  plays  a  significantly  positive,  but  minor  role.  The  results  using  the 
investment  and  trade  indices  by  Te  Velde  and  Bezemer  (2006)  also  point  at  the 
higher relevance of PTIAs for general FDI than for the large FDI activities.  
These findings, using data of Japanese FDI activities, confirm results obtained by Te 
Velde and Bezemer (2006) for UK and US FDI though the estimates in their study 
are a lot higher. The results also show that smaller-sized subsidiaries seem to drive 
the positive and significant general FDI results: the marginal PTIA effect is lower for 
large FDI than for general FDI and the significance levels are also lower when using 
the selected seven regional agreements. A signaling effect of PTIAs for FDI activities 
– if existing – is in all cases weaker than the effect of generating or enlarging smaller 
affiliates. Hence, hypothesis 2 is not supported for PTIAs.  30 
Table 3: Results (2) - Different PTIA Measures 
  General FDI  Large FDI 
  (1)  ME (e, y, p)  (2)  ME (e, y, p)  (3)  ME (e, y, p)  (4)  ME (e, y, p)  (5)  ME (e, y, p)  (6)  ME (e, y, p) 
Log GDP  3.229***  0.46 ;0.17  3.229***  0.46 ;0.17  3.247***  0.46 ;0.18  3.188***  0.45 ;0.17  4.921***  0.53 ;0.08  4.922***  0.53 ;0.08 
  (0.125)  0.06  (0.125)  0.06  (0.122)  0.06  (0.126)  0.05  (0.220)  0.02  (0.221)  0.02 
Similarity  -7.192***  -1.01 ;-0.39  -7.173***  -1.01 ;-0.39  -7.177***  -1.01 ;-0.39  -6.891***  -0.97 ;-0.37  -14.72***  -1.58 ;-0.25  -14.71***  -1.58 ;-0.25 
  (0.944)  -0.12  (0.945)  -0.12  (0.941)  -0.12  (0.953)  -0.12  (1.452)  -0.07  (1.453)  -0.07 
POLCON  0.653***  0.09 ;0.04  0.654***  0.09 ;0.04  0.602***  0.08 ;0.03  0.613***  0.09 ;0.03  1.382***  0.15 ;0.02  1.382***  0.15 ;0.02 
  (0.143)  0.01  (0.143)  0.01  (0.143)  0.01  (0.143)  0.01  (0.257)  0.01  (0.257)  0.01 
Log Distance  -3.664***  -0.52 ;-0.20  -3.665***  -0.52 ;-0.20  -3.672***  -0.52 ;-0.20  -3.744***  -0.53 ;-0.20  -5.001***  -0.54 ;-0.09  -5.003***  -0.54 ;-0.09 
  (0.301)  -0.06  (0.301)  -0.06  (0.300)  -0.06  (0.301)  -0.06  (0.486)  -0.02  (0.487)  -0.02 
Trade Openness  0.0173***  0.002 ;0.00  0.0172***  0.002 ;0.00  0.0178***  0.003 ;0.0  0.0152***  0.002 ;0.00  0.0314***  0.003 ;0.00  0.0313***  0.003 ;0.00 
  (0.00150)  0.000  (0.00150)  0.000  (0.00149)  0.000  (0.00157)  0.000  (0.00259)  0.000  (0.00259)  0.000 
Japanese BITs  0.779***  0.11 ;0.05  0.781***  0.11 ;0.05  0.722***  0.10 ;0.04  0.812***  0.12 ;0.05  2.165***  0.25 ;0.05  2.166***  0.25 ;0.05 
  (0.143)  0.01  (0.143)  0.01  (0.142)  0.01  (0.143)  0.02  (0.255)  0.01  (0.255)  0.012 
MemberRTIA  0.319***  0.05 ;0.02              0.319**  0.03 ;0.01     
  (0.0858)  0.01              (0.142)  0.00     
Log Reg.GDP      0.0121***  0.002 ;0.00              0.0119**  0.001 ;0.00 
      (0.00322)  0.000              (0.00532)  0.000 
Trade Index           0.193***  0.027 ;0.01             
          (0.0592)  0.003             
Inv. Index               0.211***  0.03 ;0.01         
              (0.0412)  0.00         
WTO-Member  -0.0808  -0.01 ;0.00  -0.0873  -0.01 ;0.01  -0.129  -0.02 ;-0.01  -0.0947  -0.01 ;-0.01  -0.184  -0.02 ;0.00  -0.192  -0.02 ;0.00 
  (0.109)  -0.001  (0.109)  -0.001  (0.110)  -0.002  (0.109)  -0.002  (0.183)  -0.001  (0.183)  -0.001 
Log Jap. ODA  0.0401***  0.01 ;0.00  0.0403***  0.01 ;0.00  0.0406***  0.01 ;0.00  0.0408***  0.01 ;0.00  0.0457***  0.01 ;0.00  0.0458***  0.01 ;0.00 
  (0.00495)  0.001  (0.00495)  0.001  (0.00495)  0.001  (0.00495)  0.001  (0.00828)  0.000  (0.00828)  0.000 
Constant  -51.57***    -51.54***    -51.96***    -49.84***    -87.86***    -87.87***   
  (4.157)    (4.157)    (4.157)    (4.147)    (6.775)    (6.792)   
l s ; 
u s   6.165; 1.833  6.167; 1.833  6.155; 1.834  6.199; 1.832  8.967; 2.452  8.974; 2.452 
LL; Pseudo R2  -16903; 0.34  -16903; 0.34  -16905; 0.34  -16898; 0.34  -11893; 0.32  -11893; 0.32 
The sample consists of 3,105 groups and 42,067 observations inc. all  sample countries. There are 6410 (3986) uncensored observations for general (large) FDI. Further 
notes as in Table 2. 
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Hypothesis 3 and 4 turn to the role of asset specificity for treaty effectiveness. 
The two measures for R&D Intensity (R&D Ind. Mean and R&D Ind. Mean 
>=1999) and the relevant interaction term to capture the effect of the treaties 
conditioned on the industry specific measure for asset specificity are added in 
the regressions.
15 Marginal effects for BIT and PTIA effectiveness are derived at 
the centiles of R&D intensity. It is expected that these should be higher for 
high-tech  industries  than  for  low-tech  ones.  The  hypothesis  can  be  claimed 
statistically secured if the second derivative, measured as the normed difference 
between treaty impact for high-tech (80th centile) and low-tech (20th centile) 
industries, is positive and significant.  
The  R&D  variable  itself  is  insignificant  in  the  case  of  general  FDI,  but 
significant for large FDI. This rejects the idea that asset-specificity per se leads 
to higher FDI. Only in combination with asset size it shows results. This result 
is also robust when omitting the three industries with insufficient parent firms.  
  
                                       
15 The interaction between the treaties and the base R&D variable R&D Ind. Mean is analyzed. As the 
calculation of one marginal effect leads to an underestimation of the effect in the period until 1999 and to 
an overestimation of the effect in and after 1999, one could argue that running two separate regressions 
would be more meaningful. However, it was preferred to not reduce the period of 15 years, as, among 
others, one of the focus variables –BITs – is limited in number. 32 
Table 4: Asset Specificity and International Trade and Investment Agreements  
   Second Derivative  First Derivatives          
 
BIT/PTIA - low R&D (20th centile) to high 
R&D (80th centile)  BIT/PTIA at selected R&D values   
     20  40  60  80  mean 
BITs                         
(1) General FDI, all countries   0.01 (0.51)  0.12 (0.00)  0.12 (0.00)  0.13 (0.00)  0.13 (0.00)  0.13 (0.00) 
(2) General FDI, dev. countries   0.01 (0.64)  0.07 (0.06)  0.07 (0.03)  0.08 (0.02)  0.08 (0.01)  0.08 (0.02) 
(3) Large FDI, all countries   0.01 (0.75)  0.26 (0.00)  0.26 (0.00)  0.26 (0.00)  0.27 (0.00)  0.26 (0.00) 
(4) Large FDI, dev. countries   -0.01 (0.86)  0.23 (0.00)  0.22 (0.00)  0.22 (0.00)  0.22 (0.00)  0.22 (0.00) 
PTIAs                
(5) General FDI, all countries  0.02 (0.09)  0.09 (0.00)  0.09 (0.00)  0.10 (0.00)  0.11 (0.00)  0.10 (0.00) 
(6) General FDI, dev.countries 
countries 
0.03 (0.06)  0.09 (0.00)  0.10 (0.00)  0.11 (0.00)  0.12 (0.00)  0.11 (0.00) 
(7) Large FDI, all countries  0.03 (0.08)  0.05 (0.00)  0.06 (0.00)  0.07 (0.00)  0.08 (0.00)  0.07 (0.00) 
(8) Large FDI, dev. countries  0.05 (0.01)  0.05 (0.02)  0.06 (0.00)  0.08 (0.00)  0.10 (0.00)  0.08 (0.00) 
Notes: Reported are the marginal effects of BITs and PTIAs and the respective p-values in parentheses (first derivatives). The marginal effect e refers to the impact of BITs 
on Japanese FDI activities in those cases when investment is above zero. Marginal effects are calculated at the mean and at the centiles of R&D Ind. Mean. The second 
derivative approximated as the normed change in BIT impact due to a move from the 20th to the 80th centile of R&D intensity is reported. Results stem from panel tobit 
estimations. A group is defined as a an industry in a country over time. The dependent variable Yijt is the natural logarithm of the share of employment attributed to the 
Japanese  owners  (total  employment*  investment  share  of  Japanese  owners  within  the  company).  In  the  general  FDI  variable  all  affiliates  are  included  in  the  data 
aggregation, in the case of large-scale FDI only affiliates with at least 100 employees. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Data is for 1990-2004. The model is 
(here for BITs – por PTIAs, BIT has to replaced with WTO-PTIAs): 
( 1) 0 &
& 1999
log max(0, . R&DInd. Mean
& Ind. Mean + R&DInd. Mean  >=1999
ij t BIT it PTIA it GDP it it Trade it pol it WTO it aid it R D jt
Int it jt R D jt
Y BIT PTIA GDP larity TradeOpenness POLCON WTO Jap Aid
BIT R D
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Investment protecting BITs should be of particular relevance when the asset 
specificity of the investment is high since such investments are more vulnerable 
to  quasi-rent  appropriation  (hypothesis  3).  The  marginal  effect  calculation 
(Table  4  rows  1-4)  shows  that  BITs  are  significant  at  all  levels  of  R&D 
intensity. But, overall, the marginal effects of BITs on FDI activities remain 
almost  the  same  with  changing  levels  of  R&D.  For  instance,  in  the  case  of 
general  FDI  using  the  sample  that  includes  all  developing  and  emerging 
economies (Table 4 row 1), a BIT raises the Japanese employment by 12% at 
the 20th centile of R&D intensity. In the case of the 80th centile this rises by 
only 1% to 13%. Consequently, the 2nd derivative is insignificant in all cases. 
Hence,  hypothesis  3  on  the  relevance  of  investment  protecting  BITs  in  the 
presence of high R&D intensity is not supported. 
Hypothesis 4 turns to the relationship between asset specificity and the PTIAs. 
The findings show that PTIAs also exert a positive impact at all levels of R&D 
intensity – for both general and large scale FDI (Table 4 rows 5-8). But here 
the overall change in the effect at the different R&D levels ranges between 2 
and 5 percentage points. The maximum is reached in the case of large scale FDI 
in developing economies. Here, Japanese employment is expected to grow by 5% 
at the 20
th centile of R&D intensity due to the conclusion of one PTIA while at 
the 80
th centile the marginal effect amounts to 10%. In this case the normed 
change in the PTIA effect (2nd derivative) is significant at the 1% level. Hence, 
there  seems  to  be  a  link  between  asset  specificity  and  PTIA  effectiveness 
providing some support for hypothesis 4. Overall, one has to be careful in the 
interpretation of the results as the industry average of the R&D intensity across 
parent firms is a very poor proxy for the transaction specific asset specificity. 34 
 
5.1.1 Discussion  
Though the tobit estimates allow for the inclusion of all developing countries as 
possible  investment  destinations  of  Japanese  firms  in  the  set-up,  several 
weaknesses have been revealed. Among others, only a random effects set-up is 
possible. Autocorrelation as well as heteroscedasticity can only be practically 
accounted  for  by  adjusting  the  standard  errors  using  weighted-bootstrapped 
standard errors. Due to the large sample and the resulting prohibitive costs of 
carrying out bootstrapping for all data points, the latter has been restricted for 
the largest industry – the electrical industry (Table 5, columns 5-8). BITs are 
not significant in the general FDI sample, but they remain significant at the 
10%  significance  level  for  large  FDI.  PTIAs  remain  significant  at  the  1% 
significance level for both samples.  
In the case of panel least squares estimation for the non-zero FDI data (Table 5, 
columns 9-12) fixed effects are included and it is controlled for autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity using robust standard errors.
16 The outcome resembles 
the previously estimated marginal effect e in terms of significance, though the 
economic magnitude of the least squares coefficients is larger - in particular with 
regard to BITs. They remain significant as opposed to the PTIAs.
  
Сonditional  Poisson  quasi-maximum  likelihood  estimation  (PQMLE)  using 
robust  standard  errors  (e.g.,  Desbordes  and  Vicard  2007;  Head  and  Ries 
                                       
16 The  Breusch  and  Pagan  Lagrangian  multiplier  test  for  random  effects  showed  that  a  random  effects 
specification is preferred to a pooled model, but a Hausman test rejects the random effects in favor of a 
fixed effects specification. 35 
forthcoming)  (Table  5,  columns  3-4)  generates  consistent  estimates  of  the 
parameters under very general conditions also when the dependent variable is 
not purely count data.
17 However, time invariant observations are also deleted 
leading to bias (Martin and Pam 2008). Here, as well, BITs are of relevance 
while this is not the case for the PTIAs. Hence, when not accounting for those 
countries which have not yet obtained investment, PTIAs are insignificant.  
One major problem in treaty impact analysis is that treaty conclusion can be 
influenced  by  the  existing  or  planned  FDI  activities.  Capturing  the  true 
influence of the agreements is thus difficult. Though this reverse causality is 
unlikely to occur in the case of PTIAs as Japan has not been involved in their 
negotiations,  it  is  an  issue  for  the  BITs.  Ideally,  good  instruments  for  the 
treaties should be found and applied. However, instruments are quite weak – as 
a  result  Aisbett  (2007),  for  instance,  turns  to  country-pair  specific  dummy 
variables to control for all unobserved effects in a country pair, and Egger and 
Merlo (2007) rely on dynamic GMM Arellano Bond estimations using the lags of 
BIT ratification as instruments.  
Here, GMM Arellano-Bond estimation is not feasible since instrumenting the 
BIT  variable  with  its  lags  does  not  pass  the  Sargan  test  of  overidentifying 
restrictions. A two stage general squares analysis with both fixed and random 
effects instrumenting the Japanese BITs with the total number of BITs a host 
country had concluded showed that BITs remain significant at the 1% level.  
Researchers studying US BITs (e.g., Haftel 2007) claim that a good indicator 
                                       
17  The  code  developed  by  Timothy  Simcoe  is  used  available  at  
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/timothy.simcoe/xtpqml.txt  based  on  Wooldridge  (1999).  As  dependent 
variable the level, not the log has to be taken. See Head and Ries (forthcoming).  36 
whether endogeneity can be assumed to be important is how the BIT partner 
countries fare in overall FDI attractiveness for US investors. They conclude that 
BITs  across  all  ranges  of  US  FDI  stock  had  been  concluded  making  reverse 
causality problems less likely. For the Japanese case this argument could also be 
raised, at least for the agreements concluded until 2002. But since the new trade 
and investment strategy has been implemented by the Japanese government, 
treaties have been mainly negotiated based on economic motivations making 
endogeneity  highly  likely  (MOFA  2008b).  As  in  this  study  only  those 
agreements ratified until 2003 were included, the endogeneity problem might be 
less pronounced, but is an issue.  
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Table 5: Sensitivity (1) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  Panel 2SLS, FE (log FDI)  PQMLE, FE robust (FDI)  Tobit, electrical industry:standard & bootstrapped (BS) errors (log FDI)  Least Squares Regression (robust) (log FDI, without 0s) 
  Gen. FDI  Large FDI  Gen. FDI  Large FDI  Gen. FDI  (BS)  Large FDI  (BS)  Gen. FDI (F)  Gen.FDI (R)  Large (F)  Large (R) 
Log GDP  1.003***  1.090***  9.210***  9.826***  4.742***  4.742***  5.748***  5.748***  2.319***  0.905***  2.492***  0.794*** 
  (0.0902)  (0.0912)  (3.000)  (3.538)  (0.582)  (0.582)  (0.766)  (1.009)  (0.154)  (0.0522)  (0.144)  (0.0459) 
Similarity  -10.79***  -12.31***  0.000***  0.000***  -6.092  -6.092  -13.18**  -13.18  -9.283***  -4.910***  -8.485***  -4.239*** 
  (0.959)  (0.970)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (4.875)  (4.875)  (5.870)  (8.873)  (0.563)  (0.387)  (0.519)  (0.331) 
POLCON  1.083***  1.052***  1.29*  1.337*  2.087***  2.087  3.536***  3.536**  0.202***  0.180**  0.152**  0.123* 
  (0.0994)  (0.101)  (0.191)  (0.214)  (0.714)  (0.714)  (1.146)  (1.659)  (0.0747)  (0.0720)  (0.0756)  (0.0703) 
Log Distance        1.857***  -2.000  -2.000  -2.983*  -2.983  -  -0.762***     
        (0.227)  (1.459)  (1.459)  (1.742)  (1.962)  -  (0.116)     
Trade Openness  0.000191  0.000881  1.003  1.004  0.0421***  0.0421**  0.0692***  0.0692***  0.005***  0.009***  0.00427***  0.00770*** 
  (0.000704)  (0.000713)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.00785)  (0.00785)  (0.0106)  (0.0241)  (0.000857)  (0.000712)  (0.000796)  (0.000676) 
Jap. BITs  11.53***  11.57***  1.707***  1.857***  3.381***  3.381  4.978***  4.978*  0.484***  0.362***  0.358***  0.184** 
  (0.842)  (0.851)  (0.196)  (0.227)  (0.699)  (0.699)  (1.180)  (2.568)  (0.0827)  (0.0780)  (0.0871)  (0.0783) 
WTO-PTIAs  0.503***  0.435***  0.977  0.974  1.868***  1.868**  2.332***  2.332***  -0.007  0.023  -0.0605  -0.0649 
  (0.0416)  (0.0421)  (0.108)  (0.119)  (0.377)  (0.377)  (0.513)  (0.673)  (0.0416)  (0.0407)  (0.0396)  (0.0403) 
WTO-Member  0.110**  0.121***  0.930  0.924  -0.270  -0.270  -0.582  -0.582  -0.086  0.047  0.0227  0.195*** 
  (0.0446)  (0.0451)  (0.094)  (0.106)  (0.610)  (0.610)  (0.757)  (1.235)  (0.0594)  (0.0579)  (0.0485)  (0.0531) 
Log Jap. ODA  0.0455***  0.0418***  0.999  0.998  0.00128  0.00128  0.0254  0.0254  0.005**  0.010***  0.00135  0.00426** 
  (0.00374)  (0.00378)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.0242)  (0.0242)  (0.0295)  (0.0470)  (0.00214)  (0.00216)  (0.00207)  (0.00208) 
Log Net Sales              10.52***  10.52***         
               (2.091)  (2.338)          
Constant  -22.98***  -25.16***      -101.7***  -101.7***  -327.3***  -327.3***  -51.74***  -11.19***  -55.58***   
  (2.068)  (2.092)      (22.14)  (22.14)  (57.58)  (69.47)  (3.802)  (1.909)  (3.597)   
Observations  31671  31671  8587  5673  1829  1829  1829  1829  6410  6410  3986  3986 
Cou.-Ind. Pairs  2415  2415  586  384  135  135  135  135  602  602  388  388 
Log Likelihood          -1182  -1182  -881.4  -881.4         
Uncensored          426  426  426  426          
l s ; 
u s   3.448  3.559      6.233, 2.236  6.233, 2.236  6.791, 2.486  6.791, 2.486  3.353  1.930  3.300  1.347 
R²                   0.110  0.247  0.276  0.119 
Sample: All developing and emerging economies, PQMLE: regression reports the incidence rate ratios. The dependent variable Y
it is the natural logarithm of the share of 
employment attributed to the Japanese owners (total employment* investment share of Japanese owners within the company). All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
year. A group is defined as an industry in a country over time (in the case of columns 5 and 6 as a country over time). If not otherwise noted, standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. The estimates for year dummies are not reported, they are, however, jointly significant in all of the models. Data is for 1990-2004. *,**,*** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 38 
For the tobit random effects model, several other specifications were tested 
to check for the sensitivity of the results.  
Including dummies for the world regions leaves the signs, significance and 
magnitude  of  the  marginal  effects  of  the  treaties  basically  unchanged 
(Table 6 columns 3-4). When including the measure for natural resources 
(Table 6 columns 1-2), the PTIA variable turns insignificant in the case of 
large FDI (column 2), but in the case of general FDI (column 1) it is still 
significant. With respect to BIT effectiveness no change occurs. However, 
the  sample  size  is  significantly  reduced  when  including  the  measure. 
Furthermore, the variable has its own problems as many of the countries 
which are assumed to have large oil and mineral exports do not report the 
figures. When including the Net Sales measure as a proxy for the average 
firm size of an industry, results do not change (Table 6 columns 5-6), also 
when excluding those industries (agriculture, mining, printing) for which 
only few parent firms had reported complete information (Table 6 columns 
7-8). 
The  base  regression  specification  was  rerun  (without  Net  Sales),  but 
excluding  the  retail  and  wholesale  industry  from  the  analysis  (Table  6 
columns 9-10). It is a rather heterogeneous industry which, among others, 
includes  the  sales  offices  of  those  companies  which  later  on  possibly 
establish value adding processes in the host countries and move from the 
retail  industry  into  one  of  the  other  sectors.  However,  despite  of  the 
omission, results remain. Omitting China from the regressions confirms the 
results as previously obtained (Table 6 columns 11-12). 
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Table 6: Sensitivity (2) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 

















































  (0.119)  (0.290)  (0.105)  (0.351)  (0.124)  (0.137)  (0.119)  (0.300)  (0.137)  (0.232)  (0.157)  (0.288) 
























  (0.970)  (1.541)  (0.930)  (1.601)  (0.967)  (1.465)  (0.990)  (1.512)  (0.980)  (1.494)  (2.770)  (5.654) 
























  (0.150)  (0.265)  (0.144)  (0.258)  (0.146)  (0.251)  (0.150)  (0.264)  (0.153)  (0.260)  (0.181)  (0.333) 
























  (0.302)  (0.563)  (0.439)  (0.733)  (0.307)  (0.361)  (0.304)  (0.467)  (0.320)  (0.503)  (0.434)  (0.724) 
























  (0.00164)  (0.00278)  (0.00151)  (0.00264)  (0.00154)  (0.00273)  (0.00157)  (0.00269)  (0.00161)  (0.00264)  (0.00200)  (0.00375) 
























  (0.143)  (0.258)  (0.141)  (0.259)  (0.146)  (0.251)  (0.150)  (0.261)  (0.149)  (0.256)  (0.206)  (0.413) 
























  (0.0833)  (0.146)  (0.0780)  (0.135)  (0.0802)  (0.136)  (0.0818)  (0.140)  (0.0836)  (0.140)  (0.0996)  (0.183) 
WTO-Member  -0.113 























  (0.116)  (0.202)  (0.108)  (0.183)  (0.111)  (0.181)  (0.114)  (0.189)  (0.118)  (0.186)  (0.147)  (0.276) 
























  (0.00522)  (0.00876)  (0.00503) 
 
(0.00837)  (0.00506)  (0.00832)  (0.00519)  (0.00854)  (0.00526)  (0.00843)  (0.00690)  (0.0122) 40 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 





























                 
  (0.0443)  (0.0823)                     




             
      (0.436)  (0.736)                 
Asia      -0.0779 
 [-0.01 ] 
1.532*  
[0.17 ] 
             
      (0.520)  (0.879)                 




             
      (0.495)  (1.034)                 
Pacific      1.041 [0.15 ]  3.902* [0.48 ]               
      (1.180)  (2.119)                 








     
          (0.114)  (0.178)  (0.132)  (0.224)         
Constant  -44.87***  -72.22***  -33.92***  -62.26***  -54.83***  -71.60***  -60.38***  -83.21***  -51.28***  -90.13***  -56.36***  -104.5*** 
  (4.080)  (7.992)  (5.134)  (11.58)  (4.701)  (5.780)  (4.823)  (9.593)  (4.574)  (7.105)  (5.108)  (9.881) 
Observations  29348  29348  42067  42067  38409  38409  32922  32922  40238  40238  39353  39353 
Cou.-Ind. Pairs  2806  2806  3105  3105  2835  2835  2430  2430  2970  2970  2921  2921 
Uncensored  5655  3586  6410  3986  6021  3813  5535  3543  5775  3692  4700  2707 
l s ; 
u s   5.912, 1.749  8.695, 2.370  5.981, 1.827  7.903, 2.443  6.147, 1.807  8.473, 2.408  5.722, 1.767  7.638, 2.352  6.237, 1.857  9.212, 2.394  6.690, 2.092  10.30, 2.797 
Log-Likelih.  -14630  -10565  -16847  -11865  -15686  -11271  -14178  -10274  -15327  -10880  -13489  -8740 
Mc Fadden Pseudo R2  0.34  0.32  0.34  0.32  0.34  0.33  0.33  0.31  0.34  0.34  0.34  0.32 
Sample includes all developing & emerging economies. The marginal effects e at the means of the explanatory variables are reported in brackets.  
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To check for the validity of the interaction between asset specificity and the 
agreements, inflation and total FDI were included as well as those industries 
with an insufficient number of observations were omitted (agriculture, mining 
and printing) (Table 7). In all cases, the second derivative for the interaction 
between R&D intensity of the industry and BITs is insignificant and for the one 
with PTIAs manages robustly the 10% level. 
Hence, results are quite robust – overall the BIT variable is significant at all 
specifications for large FDI and the effect is always larger than in the case of 
general FDI. The PTIA variable is relevant for general FDI, but not always for 
large FDI. Also, the marginal effect of the PTIA variable is lower for large FDI 
than for general FDI. The interaction between R&D and BITs is not significant 
while the one with PTIAs at least manage robustly the 10% level. Thus, robust 
support for hypothesis 1 and 4 and for the rejection of hypothesis 2 and 3 is 
found. 
 42 
Table 7: Sensitivity (3) 
BIT  Second Derivative  First Derivatives          
 
BIT/ PTIA - low (20th 
centile) to high R&D (80th 
centile)  BIT/ PTIA  at selected R&D values     
BITs             
(1) Large Scale FDI, developing 
countries, + Inflation and total FDI 
 0.00 (0.83)  0.17 (0.00)  0.17 (0.00)  0.17 (0.00)  0.17 (0.00)  0.17 (0.00) 
(2) Large Scale FDI, developing 
countries, without industries with 
low number of observations 
(Agriculture, Mining, Printing) 
  -0.01 (0.88)  0.23 (0.00)  0.23 (0.00)  0.23 (0.00)  0.23 (0.00)  0.23 (0.00) 
PTIAs                       
(6) General FDI, developing 
countries, + Inflation and total FDI 
0.03 (0.10)  0.10 (0.00)  0.11 (0.00)  0.12 (0.00)  0.13 (0.00)  0.12 (0.00) 
(7) General FDI, developing 
countries, without industries with 
low number of observations 
(Agriculture, Mining, Printing) 
0.04 (0.04)  0.08 (0.00)  0.09 (0.00)  0.10 (0.00)  0.12 (0.00)  0.10 (0.00) 
(8) Large FDI, developing countries, 
+ Inflation and total FDI 
0.04 (0.04)  0.05 (0.01)  0.06 (0.00)  0.08 (0.00)  0.10 (0.00)  0.08 (0.00) 
Table 4 presents details.  
 43 
6.  CONCLUSION 
This  study  has  analyzed  the  impact  of  international  trade  and  investment 
agreements on FDI in developing and emerging economies using evidence from 
Japanese  companies.  It  contributes  to  the  existing  literature  by  capturing 
differential impact of PTIAs and BITs according to FDI characteristics.  
There is relatively robust evidence that Japanese BITs have increased FDI in 
the partner countries in the form of larger affiliates. For PTIAs large FDI is also 
affected, but to a lower degree than in the case of BITs. In the case of PTIAs 
also trade liberalization effects are at work which make it difficult to disentangle 
size  effects,  the  latter  seemingly  favoring  smaller  investments.  The  asset 
specificity has not been identified as a major characteristic that differentiates 
BIT or PTIA impact. Only for PTIAs evidence in this respect is generated: 
investment of high-tech industries is to a higher degree attracted to countries 
which have concluded PTIAs than low-tech industries.  
However, the economic magnitude of the treaty effects is quite low as compared 
to the impact of many of the control variables and the results underlie several 
limitations.  Reverse  causality  between  BITs  and  FDI  may  occur.  It  is 
rudimentarily taken account of by using lagged explanatory variables, but it is 
in the nature of the treaties that they are concluded not only with the purpose 
of investment promotion, but also then, when companies are most likely to take 
advantage of them. Moreover, due to the few BITs the question arises in how 
far these results can be generalized for other source or host countries. Further 
limitations  are  the  rather  strong  assumptions  involved  when  applying  the 
random effects Tobit model.  
In  spite  of  these  limits,  results  have  proven  to  be  quite  robust  and  follow 
theoretic  predictions.  The  work  substantially  extends  existing  literature  by 44 
supporting  the  role  of  sunk  cost  for  carrying  out  FDI  in  explaining  treaty 
effects.  Further  research  should  find  ways  around  the  endogeneity  problem. 
Conducting  such  disaggregated  analyses  for  other  major  investment  source 
countries which have concluded a larger number of BITs in the past and are 
also directly involved in PTIAs with developing and emerging economies would 
also be promising.  
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Table 8: Selected PTIAs  
Agreement 
 








Entry into Force (1)    2000  1992  1994  1995  1993  2001  1992 
Average GDP of the 
Partner Countries (2) 
 
156  160  10,500  890  258  30.4  548 
Trade Clauses 
Liberalization  Zero tariffs on Intra-
regional trade 
l  l  c  l/c  l/c  l/c  l/c 
  Common external 
tariff regime 
-  -  -  l  l  l  - 
Investment Clauses 
Establishment Right  y  -  y  y  -  y*  y 
Prohibition of 
Restrictions on  the 
Transfer of Funds 





-  -  y  y  -  -  - 
    - NT  -  -  y  y  (y)  (y)*  y 
    - MFN  -  -  y  y  (y)  y*  y 
Fair, Equal Treatment  y  -  y  y  -  -  - 
Expropriation  y  -  y  y  y  -  - 
Legal Protection 
After Entry 
Intellectual Property   -  -  y  -  -  y*  - 
    - State-State  y  y  y  y  y  y*  y  Dispute Settlement 
    - Investor-State  -  y  y  y  y   y*   y 
Treaty Outsider?    -  -  p  p  y  -  -  
Te Velde and Bezemer Classification 







Trade  Index (4)    1(1994)  1(1992)  2(1994)  3(1991)  1(1987) 
2(1993) 
2 (1982)           
3 (1997) 
1(1980) 
Own, based on UNCTAD (2006b), Te Velde and Fahnbulleh (2003), Te Velde and Bezemer (2006), World Bank 
(2007) & others. Table 9 provides details on member countries. 
l = exists, but list of exclusions; c= far-reaching/ (almost) complete; y= included; (y)=included, but can be regulated 
in national law; *=not ratified by all members; p= partially; -=not included 
(1) Date of entry into force of the major agreement according to official sources – can differ from the dates by Te Velde 
and Bezemer (2006).   
(2) Calculated as the GDP of the region minus the GDP of the individual member country. Values in billion US$ 
constant  2000,  mean  value  for  all  member  countries  1990-2004.  This  variable  will  occur  (natural  logarithm 
transformed) in the estimations as Log Add. Reg.GDP.  
(3) Investment Index: 0 if not member of group; 1 if some investment provisions in region; 2 if advanced investment 
provisions in region; 3 if complete investment provisions in region; -1 if more restrictive provisions (Te Velde and 
Bezemer 2006). 
(4) Trade Index: 0 if not member of group; 1 if some trade provisions (e.g., tariff preferences); 2 if low Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) tariffs, (close to) zero intra-regional tariffs; 3 if high MFN tariffs, (close to) zero intra-regional tariffs 
(Te Velde and Bezemer 2006). Table 9: Selected PTIAs: Member Countries   
 
Date of entry into force
  and member countries 
COMESA 
2000: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
SADC  
1992: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (1997), Lesotho, 
Madagascar (2005), Malawi, Mauritius (1995), Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa 
(1994), Seychelles (1997-2003), Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe,  
MERCOSUR   1995: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay (1996), Uruguay (1996), [Venezuela (2006)]  
ANDEAN 
1993: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru (except 1992– 1997) and Venezuela [ until 
2006], 
CARICOM 
2001: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti (2002-2003), Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago 
NAFTA  1994: US, Canada, Mexico 
ASEAN 
1992 AFTA: Brunei, Cambodia (1999), Indonesia, Laos (1997), Malaysia, 
Myanmar (1997), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam (1995) 
Sources: Various  
Notes: Date of entry into force of the major agreement according to official sources. If countries joined the grouping 
at a later stage or left it, the years are indicated in parentheses after the respective country.  
Table 8 provides for further information on the agreements. 
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Table 10: International Trade and Investment Agreements Japan (as of Aug 2008) 
  Signature  In Force  Status-quo 
Bilateral investment treaties BITs 
Bangladesh  1998  1999   
China  1988  1989   
Egypt  1977  1978   
Hong Kong  1997  1997   
Korea  2002  2003   
Mongolia  2001  2002   
Pakistan  1998  2002   
Russia  1998  2000   
Sri Lanka  1982  1982   
Turkey  1992  1993   
Vietnam  2003  2004   
Cambodia  2007 (April)  2008 (July)   
Laos  2008 (Jan)  2008 (July)   
Uzbekistan  2008 (Aug)     
Saudi-Arabia      Under negotiation 
Qatar  2008    About to start negotiations 
Trilateral investment treaties  
China, Korea, Japan      Third round of discussion 11/2007  
Economic Partnership Agreements (Preferential trade and investment agreements PTIA) 
Singapore  2002  2002  In 03/2007 signature of a Protocol amending 
the Agreement, entry into force in 01/2008  
Mexico  2004  2005  In 09/2006 an additional protocol was 
signed, entry into force 04/2007 
Malaysia  2005  2006   
Philippines  2006    Ratified by the Japanese Diet 12/2006, not 
yet ratified by the Philippines  
Chile  2007 (March)  2007 (Sept)   
Thailand  2007 (April)  2007 (Nov)   
Brunei  2007 (June)  2008 (July)   
Indonesia  2007 (August)  2008 (July)    
Korea       “Official negotiations” – negotiations have 
halted last round ended in 11/2004   
ASEAN      Agreement finalized 04/2008 
Gulf Cooperation Council      2
nd round of negotiations in 01/ 2007.  
Vietnam      - 7
th meeting in April 2008. 
- First round of negotiations in 01/2007 
India      9
th meeting September 2008 
Negotiations started in 01/2007  
Switzerland      7
th round,negotiations 06/ 2008  
Australia      2
nd round of negotiations 09/2007.  
ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, 
Korea), ASEAN 10+5 (+ Hong 
Kong, Taiwan) 
     
 
“Discussion in the future” 
Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership in East Asia.( 
ASEAN+3, India, Australia, and 
New Zealand) 
    Proposed in August 2006 (Bridges Weekly 
2006). 
Source: MOFA (2008a) 55 
 
Table 11: General FDI per Industry: Japanese Employment (Natural Logarithm)  
   Mean   Median   Max   Min.   Std. Dev.   Obs. 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries  4.69  4.86  8.32  1.16  1.74  272 
Ceramic, stone and clay products  6.33  6.94  9.04  0.69  1.70  228 
Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber, etc.  6.19  6.49  10.46  0.69  2.46  369 
Construction  4.60  4.73  8.26  0.69  2.18  396 
Electrical machinery, Equipment and 
Supply  7.09  7.21  12.32  0.84  2.85  430 
Fabricated metal products  6.76  7.05  9.55  1.39  1.52  185 
Finance and insurance  4.76  4.77  8.69  0.69  2.17  294 
Food, beverages, tabacco and prepared 
an  6.34  6.56  9.94  2.59  1.84  260 
General Machinery  6.38  7.07  10.58  0.69  2.24  284 
Iron and Steel  5.20  5.36  8.49  1.22  1.61  294 
Lumber and wood products and Pulp, 
paper  5.63  5.40  9.19  2.11  1.83  202 
Mining  5.02  5.58  7.62  1.61  1.34  138 
Miscellaneous industries  4.92  4.98  9.33  0.69  2.26  451 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries  5.55  6.10  8.98  1.10  2.20  325 
Non-ferrous metals and products  6.48  6.83  9.31  2.60  1.75  240 
Precision instruments and machinery  7.23  7.48  10.17  2.77  1.55  192 
Printing and Allied Industry  5.41  5.76  7.78  0.69  1.64  117 
Real estate  3.95  3.80  7.00  0.69  1.59  165 
Stock holding and Controlling 
Companies  5.09  5.27  8.69  0.69  2.35  109 
Textile mill products and Apparel  6.71  6.94  11.04  2.13  1.96  318 
Transport, electricity, gas, heat supply  5.08  5.00  8.85  0.97  2.13  346 
Transportation Equipment  6.62  7.17  10.71  0.69  2.52  429 
Wholesale and retail trade  5.20  5.25  9.94  0.69  2.21  675 
All  5.72  5.77  12.32  0.69  2.28  6719 
Source: Toyo Keizai (1990-2005). Statistics for positive observations for developing and emerging economies. Japanese 
employment (at least 10% ownership) for the selected country sample (1990-2004)  per industry. 
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Table 12: Large FDI per Industry: Japanese Employment (Natural Logarithm) 
   Mean   Median   Max   Min.   Std. Dev.   Obs. 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries  6.15  6.14  8.22  4.62  0.86  122 
Ceramic, stone and clay products  6.95  7.01  8.84  4.63  0.94  177 
Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber etc.  7.25  7.47  10.20  4.61  1.42  258 
Construction  6.13  6.17  7.86  4.62  1.01  170 
Electrical machinery, Equipment and 
Supply  8.38  8.52  12.30  4.63  2.18  310 
Fabricated metal products  6.97  6.69  9.36  4.71  1.01  153 
Finance and insurance  6.42  6.68  8.63  4.61  1.16  108 
Food, beverages, tabacco and prepared 
an  6.98  6.79  9.83  4.66  1.30  196 
General Machinery  7.36  7.32  10.43  4.61  1.27  203 
Iron and Steel  6.04  5.96  8.41  4.61  0.98  168 
Lumber and wood products and Pulp, 
paper  6.97  7.11  9.07  4.83  1.07  104 
Mining  5.73  5.76  7.62  4.61  0.59  91 
Miscellaneous industries  6.28  6.11  9.04  4.62  1.16  247 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries  6.83  6.84  8.94  4.61  1.22  207 
Non-ferrous metals and products  7.09  7.24  9.25  4.61  1.26  187 
Precision instruments and machinery  7.49  7.47  10.13  4.77  1.19  175 
Printing and Allied Industry  6.42  6.61  7.77  4.61  0.83  72 
Real estate  5.38  5.30  6.12  4.72  0.37  36 
Stock holding and Controlling 
Companies  6.50  6.72  8.68  4.62  1.14  65 
Textile mill products and Apparel  7.27  7.28  10.96  4.91  1.63  255 
Transport, electricity, gas, heat supply  6.55  6.78  8.65  4.62  1.22  154 
Transportation Equipment  7.82  7.75  10.64  4.61  1.50  312 
Wholesale and retail trade  6.50  6.01  9.51  4.61  1.47  303 
All  6.95  6.84  12.30  4.61  1.49  4073 
Source: Toyo Keizai (1990-2005). Statistics for positive observations for developing and emerging economies. Japanese 
employment (at least 10% ownership) for the selected country sample (1990-2004)  per industry. 57 
 Table 13: Sample Countries 
Albania  Algeria  Angola  Argentina  Armenia  Azerbaijan  Bangladesh  Belarus  Benin  Bhutan  Bolivia  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  Botswana  Brazil  Bulgaria  Burkina  Faso  Burundi  Cambodia  Cameroon  Cape  Verde  Central  African 
Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Croatia 
Czech Republic Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Fiji Gabon Gambia, The Georgia Ghana Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana 
Haiti Honduras Hong Kong, China Hungary India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Rep. Israel Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan 
Kenya Korea, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Lao PDR Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Lithuania Macao Macedonia, 
FYR  Madagascar  Malawi  Malaysia  Maldives  Mali  Mauritania  Mauritius  Mexico  Moldova  Mongolia  Morocco 
Mozambique Namibia Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman Pakistan Palau Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay 
Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia 
and Montenegro Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia South Africa Sri Lanka Sudan Swaziland 
Syrian  Arab  Republic  Taiwan  Tajikistan  Tanzania  Thailand  Togo  Trinidad  and  Tobago  Tunisia  Turkey 
Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela, RB Vietnam Yemen, Rep. Zambia Zimbabwe  
 
Note: Countries entering the baseline regressions (Table 2 column 1). 58 
 
Table 14: Overview: Variables, Expected Impact, and Datasources  
Variable  Definition  Expected 
Impact 
source 
Dependent Variable       
Log Employment  Natural logarithm of the total employment* investment 
share of Japanese owners within the company if the 
Japanese investment share amounts to at least 10%.  
  Toyo Keizai 
Focus Variables       
Jap. BIT  A dummy which is 1 if the destination country i ratified 
a bilateral investment treaty with Japan in year t and all 
following years. 
+  UNCTAD 
WTO-PTIAs  A dummy variable which captures membership (year of 
entry-into force) for country i in year t in at least one 
trade and investment agreement as notified to the WTO 
and all the following years 
+  WTO (2006) 
Membership RTIA  Dummy for membership in at least one of the selected 
regional trade and investment agreement and all the 
following years. 




Log Add. Reg.GDP  The natural logarithm of the sum of the total GDP of 
the RTIA partner countries (own GDP is not included) 
in the years a country is member to the respective 
selected regional trade and investment agreement 
+  Te Velde and 
Bezemer 
(2006), WDI & 
various sources  
Trade Index  Index of Trade Liberalization which takes a value from 
0-3 depending on the degree of trade liberalization 
prevailing in one of the respective RTIAs in which a 
country is a member. 
+  Te Velde and 
Bezemer (2006) 
Invest. Index  Index of Investment Liberalization which takes a value 
from 0-3 depending on the degree of trade liberalization 
prevailing in one of the respective RTIAs in which a 
country is a member. 
+  Te Velde and 
Bezemer (2006) 
Economic Controls       
Log GDP  The natural logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product - 




Log Distance  Natural logarithm of the circle distance between the 
capital of the destination country and Tokyo 
-  CEPII distance 
measures 
Similarity  Host country’s GDP per capita divided by Japanese 
GDP per capita measured in constant US Dollar for the 




Trade openness  (Exports plus imports in US Dollar for the year 2000)/ 
GDP measured in constant US Dollar for the year 2000 
+/-  WDI 2007 
Log of Total FDI Inflows 
Host Country 
The amount of total FDI inflows into a host country by 
all investor nations as recorded in the host country’s 
Balance of Payments (natural logarithmic 
transformation) measured in constant US Dollar for the 
year 2000 values. 
+  WDI 2007 59 
 
Variable  Definition  Expected 
Impact 
source 
Inflation  The size of inflation in a host country indicates the level 
of macroeconomic instability. A natural logarithmic 
transformation is applied. 
-  WDI 2007 
Natural Resources  The natural resource intensity of a country measured as 
the fuel and mineral share in overall exports of a 
country. 
 
+/-  WDI 2007 
Political Controls       
POLCON  The political constraints index (POLCON) measures the 
political institutional stability of an economy. It ranges 
from 0-1 – the higher the value, the less feasible is policy 
change. 
+  Henisz (2002) 
ICRG  The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
composite index measures political risk as perceived by 
country experts and ranges from 0-100 while 0 refers to 
high risk and 100 to low risk  
+  PRS (1996) 
Log Japanese ODA   Natural logarithm of positive values of total Official 
Development Assistance provided by Japan (in constant 
US Dollar for the year 2000). Negative values are 
replaced by 0. 0 values are inserted for those countries 
where no values for Japan are reported while other 
donours have provided aid. 
+  OECD 
Develop-ment 
Statistics 
WTO Member  A dummy variable that reflects membership in the 
GATT/ WTO: it turns 1 in the year a country has 
joined the GATT or WTO and all following years. 
0  WTO 
Industry Controls       
R&D Ind. Mean (R&D 
Ind. Mean >=1999) 
Research and Development expenses over Net Sales of 
listed parent firms (Research and Development expenses 
over Net Sales of listed parent firms for the years from 
1999) 
+  DBJ 
Net Sales  Net Sales as obtained from the company's financial 
statements and reported in the database 
+  DBJ 
WDI= World Development Indicators; DBJ= Development Bank of Japan;  CEPII=  Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives Internationales; PRS = Political Risk Services Group. 
Constant Values were deflated using the US GDP deflator from the WDI.  
+ = positive, - = negative, 0 = no significant impact 60 
 
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics – per Parent Firm (DBJ) 
























Agriculture, forestry, fisheries  2  0.010  0.010  24.2  21.2 
Ceramic, stone, clay  47  0.021  0.018  108  45.9 
Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber 
and allied products  158  0.051  0.041  171  70.2 
Construction  82  0.003  0.003  309  189 
Electrical  200  0.039  0.028  259  47.4 
Fabricated metal products  43  0.018  0.012  72.6  24.1 
Food, beverages, tabacco et al.  63  0.014  0.010  267  154 
General machinery  151  0.026  0.020  139  40.0 
Iron and steel  30  0.012  0.010  294  91.5 
Lumber, wood, pulp, paper  23  0.010  0.006  122  42.1 
Mining  5  0.011  0.010  51.5  41.2 
Miscellaneous industries  113  0.033  0.009  61.5  28 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  70  0.027  0.018  83.3  43.0 
Non-ferrous metals & products  29  0.021  0.017  194  115 
Precision inst. & machinery  41  0.041  0.035  67.4  39.2 
Printing and allied Industry  10  0.013  0.011  348  114 
Textile and apparel  45  0.023  0.014  89.1  44.8 
Transport, electricity et al.  78  0.010  0.007  298  69.5 
Transportation Equipment  111  0.023  0.015  386  73 
Wholesale and retail trade  240  0.004  0.002  730  105 
Finance and insurance  --  --  --  --  -- 
Real estate  --  --  --  --  -- 
Stock Holdings  --  --  --  --  -- 
Source: DBJ 2004  61 
 
Table 16: Correlation Matrix: Base Model Specification  









Log GDP   22.88 
     
1.95   17.45 
    
28.07  1.000                 
Similarity 
     
0.07 
     
0.10 
     
0.00 
     
0.70  0.425  1.000               
POLCON 
     
0.36 
     
0.31 
     
0.00 
     
0.89  0.344  0.260  1.000             
Log Distance 
     
9.17 
     
0.49 
     
7.05 
     
9.83  -0.328  -0.265  -0.026  1.000           
Trade Openness  81.03  49.85   13.24  398.80  -0.122  0.476  0.102  -0.206  1.000         
Japanese BITs 
     
0.04 
     
0.20 
     
0.00 
     
1.00  0.265  0.065  0.003  -0.265  -0.019  1.000       
WTO-PTIAs 
     
0.53 
     
0.50 
     
0.00 
     
1.00  0.092  0.033  0.268  0.160  0.123  -0.092  1.000     
WTO-Member 
     
0.68 
     
0.47 
     
0.00 
     
1.00  0.117  0.072  0.314  0.272  -0.025  0.051  0.163  1.000   
Log Jap. ODA   13.57 
     
6.32 
     
0.00 
    
21.03  -0.148  -0.329  -0.179  0.108  -0.238  0.036  -0.085  0.122  1.000 
Table 2 column 1 reports the coefficient and marginal effects. 62 
 
Appendix 1: Log-Likelihood Function of Tobit 
The standard tobit model with random effects in a panel context has a joint 
density for the ijth panel and correspondingly panel level likelihood  ij ℓ  of 
(14)  ( ) ( ) ij ij ijt ijt
T
t
ijT ij ijT ij d X y F
e







































+ ¢ - - - 0        if       exp ) 2 (  
0          if                              
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e refers to the exponential function, p  is a mathematical constant which is the 
ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter and equals approximately 
3.14159, and  (.) F the cumulative distributive function of the standard normal 
distribution. 
Thus,  the  likelihood  function  for  the  whole  sample  (135  developing  and 
emerging countries i and 23 industries j) is the product of the joint densities 
across individuals ij. The log-likelihood is therefore: 







1 1 ,..., ,...., log
i j
ijT ij ijT ij X X y y f L  
The log-likelihood is computed with the M-Point Gauss-Hermite quadrature as 
suggested by Butler and Moffit (1982) and is maximized (Bruno 2004).  63 
 
Appendix 2: Marginal Effect Calculation for Interactions in Tobit 
Since Norton et al. (2004) have emphasized the need for correctly calculating 
the marginal effects and standard errors in the case of logit and probit models 
with  interaction  terms,  this  topic  has  been  an  issue  when  using  non-linear 
models. However, the correct derivations in the case of a tobit model have not 
been provided. Therefore, the logic of Norton et al. (2004) is applied using the 
formulas as provided in Wooldridge (2002) and McDonald and Moffitt (1980) to 
derive the respective expressions for the marginal effects. 
In the context of this study interaction occurs between one continuous variable 
(the  measure  for  R&D  intensity)  and  one  dichotomous  0-1  dummy  variable 
(BIT  or  PTIA  conclusion).  For  illustrative  purposes,  the  example  of  the 
interaction of BIT conclusion (BIT) and the R&D intensity (R&D) is used. The 
interaction term between the two is abbreviated with INT.  
The formulas with regard to the impact of the interacted variables and other 
control  variables 
k x  on  the  change  of  the  dependent  variable  ijt y  given  that 
positive  values  are  observed  are  provided  -  the  conditional  marginal  effect, 
previously defined as e  
k x
y X y E
¶
> ¶ ) 0 , (
. 
z in the example looks like   
(17)  & & & INT BIT R D X R D BIT BIT R D
z
b b b b
s





~  refers  to  the  K-3  long  vector  of  the  independent  variables  which 
remain in the regression in addition to the interacted variables, b
~
 denotes the 
corresponding  coefficients,  and  the  dash  refers  to  the  mean  value  of  the 
explanatory variables X
~
, R&D, and BIT across all  countries, industries, and 64 
 
years.  
The first derivatives for the interacted variables are the following:  
·  For  the  continuous  interacted  variable,  in  this  example  R&D  intensity 
(R&D), the marginal effect is not simply the adjusted coefficient  & R D b , 
but may be substantially higher or lower in proportion to the coefficient of 
the interaction term.  




( * )* 1 * ( )/ ( ) ( ) / ( )
&
R D INT
E y X y
BIT z z z z z
R D
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·  For the dichotomous variable BIT the marginal effect is calculated as:  
(19)  ) 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 1 , (
) 0 , (
> = - > = =
D
> D
y BIT X y E y BIT X y E
BIT
y X y E
. 
As the expected value of positive FDI is defined as 
(20)  ( )
( ) z
z
X y X y E
F
× + ¢ = >
f
s b ) 0 , ( , 
The expected value of positive FDI when a BIT is concluded, thus at the 
value of 1 for BIT, and when a BIT has not been concluded – at the value 
zero is defined. The other explanatory variables are kept at their mean 
values. For presentation purposes consider zpos and zzer 
(21)  & & 1 1 & INT BIT R D
pos
X R D R D
z
b b b b
s




(22)  & & & 0 0 & & INT BIT R D R D
zer
X R D R D X R D
z
b b b b b b
s s
¢ ¢ + × × + × + × + ×
= =
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ
. 
Then,  65 
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Opening the brackets and simplifying yields: 














  ¶ >   = + × + × -  
¶ F F    
. 
The eventual magnitude of the adjusted marginal effects strongly depends on 
the interaction term.  
Second derivative for the R&D intensity e. The second derivative focusing on 
the R&D intensity measures the change in impact of R&D intensity on FDI 
activities due to the conclusion of a BIT:  
(25) 
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Using the notation as introduced in equation (21) and (22) transforms equation 
(25) to: 
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The second derivative focusing on BITs measures the change in impact of the 
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The derivative is approximated through a difference term:  
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¶ D > D »
¶ D ×D
           D × + - × +      F F             =
D
. 
Thus, the analysis is restricted to the influence of a move from low to high 
R&D intensity on BIT effectiveness. Four terms –  high pos z _  ,  high zero z _ ,  low pos z _ , 
low zero z _  – are defined in this context. They differ if a BIT is concluded and takes 
the value 1 or if it is not, then taking the value 0, and if the R&D intensity is 
defined as high ( &
high R D ) or low ( &
low R D ). High values are calculated as the 
80
th centile value of the R&D intensity, thus, the value at or below which 80% 
of all industries are found with respect to their R&D intensity. Low values use 
the  20%  centile  value.  Maximum  and  minimum  values  were  not  used  to 
calculate  the  second  derivatives  in  order  to  not  distort  the  results  due  to 
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